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A Tale of Two Economies
During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan emerged as the world's second largest economy, surpassed onlyby the
United States. The foundation of Japan's success was industrial innovation in a wide varietyof mechanical and
electronic applications that directly confronted the previously unchallengedposition of the United States as the
world's pre-eminent mass producer. During the 1980s Americanmanufacturers looked to Japan for the latest in
best-practice industrial management, while Japanesecompanies brought their learning, and money, directly to
the United States.
Meanwhile, within Japan, the phenomenal success of its industrial corporations sparked a boom instock prices
that during the late 1980s reached unprecedented speculative heights. By 1989, theaverage price-earnings ratio
of shares listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange(that is, stocks of the major industrial
corporations) was over 70, when the comparable price-earnings ratio in the United States was less than 13.1
While dividend yields on these Japanesestocks were minimal -- 0.39 percent in 1989 compared with 3.29
percent in the United States --the rise in TSE (First Section) stock prices generated a compound annual rate of
return of over30 percent between 1985 and 1989.2 
Then, in 1990, the Japanese stock market crashed. With the falling stock market came fallingland prices and an
accumulation of bad bank loans that in the late 1990s still will not go away. In addition to this banking crisis,
the need to support retirees in a nation with a rapidly agingpopulation has resulted in a burgeoning government
deficit; Japan now ranks highest amongthe OECD nations in government debt as a proportion of GDP.3
Japan's financial morass andrecessionary conditions in the 1990s stand in contrast to both its high-growth era
that stretchedfrom the mid-1950s to the early 1970s and its booming prosperity from the late 1970s throughthe
1980s. The growth rate of the Japanese economy has sputtered throughout the 1990s. In fiscal 1996 (through
March 31, 1997), the rate of real GDP growth was less than onepercent. During the first quarter of fiscal 1997
real GDP dropped by 2.9 percent.4 By worldstandards, Japan's current unemployment rate of less than three
and a half percent isenviable, but by Japan's own post-World War II standards, the unemployment rates of
1996and 1997 are the highest since the current mode of calculating the rates began in 1953.5 Formany, if not
most, economists, Japan is now facing the real world of international economics,and unless it quickly
deregulates its capital and labor markets, it will not be able to get itseconomy back on track.
Meanwhile, in the United States, throughout the 1990s stock markets have been booming, andfrom the
mid-1990s the economy has been growing rapidly. The current U.S. unemployment rateof 4.6 percent is the
lowest for the nation since the late 1960s.6 The financial turmoil that theUnited States experienced in the
1980s, with the savings and loans crisis and major bank failures,now seems to be a thing of the past. Despite
lingering concerns on the part of some Americaneconomists with growing income inequality and corporate
downsizing, the current perception ofthe U.S. economy, both at home and abroad, is that in the late 1990s it is
back on a path ofsustained growth that will benefit more and more Americans as time goes by. 
The purpose of this paper is to take issue with these perceptions of the weakness of the Japaneseeconomy and
the relative strength of the American economy for generating sustainable prosperity-- the spreading of thebenefits of economic growth to more and more people over a prolongedperiod of time.7 The main propositions
on the sources of sustainable prosperity that underlie thisargument are:
1. the economic development of advanced economies depends critically on the investment strategies of
corporate enterprises to generate organizational learning; 
2. both U.S. and Japanese corporate enterprises are making, and will continue to make, investments in
organizational learning that can result in higher quality, lower cost products; 
3. the prevalence of strategies of U.S. corporations that favor the downsizing of corporate labor forces
and the distribution of corporate revenues to financial interests means, however, that the corporate
contribution to organizational learning in the United States will fall short of that required for
sustainable prosperity; 
4. in contrast to this "downsize and distribute" strategy of U.S. corporations, Japanese corporate
enterprises are pursuing, and will continue to pursue, a strategy of retaining corporate revenues and
reallocating the labor force in ways that promote sustainable prosperity; 
5. the choice between the downsize and distribute strategy that is more prevalent among U.S.
corporations and the "retain and reallocate" strategy that is more prevalent among Japanese
corporations reflects fundamental institutional differences between the two nations in the ways in
which, at the macroeconomic level, money is saved and invested and, at the microeconomic level,
corporate enterprises are governed; 
6. in terms of sustainable national economic performance, the downsize and distribute strategy supports a
system of saving and investment that favors living off the past, whereas the retain and reallocate
strategy supports a system of saving and investment that favors investing for the future.8 
In the advanced economies, major industrial corporations, by virtue of their prior success indeveloping and
utilizing productive resources, control at any point in time vast amounts ofproductive resources and financial
returns that remain to be allocated to alternative uses. Corporate strategy is about the forms that these allocation
decisions take, and corporategovernance is about the institutions that shape these allocation decisions.9 These
institutions,which reflect the ways in which people are employed and the ways in which investments
arefinanced, have deep historical roots in particular social -- generally national -- environments.10 
But these institutions also evolve historically in response to the emergence of new pressures oncorporations to
allocate their resources and returns differently than they had in the past. Thus,for example, in comparison with
the Japanese experience, throughout the twentieth century, theinstitutions of employment and finance that have
prevailed in the United States have placed muchmore pressure on corporations to downsize and distribute. Yet,
in historical perspective, the forceof those pressures has changed, so that the ways in which U.S. corporations
allocate resourcesand returns in the 1990s look much different even than in the 1970s. 
In the case of the United States, the main sources of these pressures since the 1970s have been international
competition and intergenerational dependence.11 International competition haschanged the ways in which U.S.
corporations must allocate resources to organizational learningto generate returns. Intergenerational
dependence has changed the demands on corporationsto allocate returns to support people in retirement rather
than employment. In the 1990s, thesepressures of international competition and intergenerational dependence
have been building inother advanced economies as well. Currently, for example, as Mary O'Sullivan argues,
corporategovernance in Germany is at a crossroads in responding to these pressures.12 
Japan is not immune to the pressures of intergenerational dependence and internationalcompetition. Japan now
has the most rapidly aging society in the world. At the same time, itremains a power in international industrial
competition, and, despite high wages and a relativelystrong currency, continues to create competitive pressures
on the rest of the world. But Japan hasalso been a victim of its own competitive strength. The current banking
crisis is the result of theways in which, during the 1980s, the Japanese financial system reallocated the
enormousfinancial returns of the nation's industrial success. Moreover, during the 1990s, the power ofJapanese
industry has led to a sharp increase in Japanese foreign direct investment, particularlyin Asia, that has raised
fears in Japan of an industrial "hollowing out". In response to thesepressures, Japanese corporations are
having to learn new ways of allocating resources andreturns. This paper represents an attempt to explain the institutions of corporate governance that prevailin Japan in the
late 1990s, how they supported the retain and reallocate strategy in the past, andhow in response to the
productive and financial pressures of the 1990s, Japanese corporationsare changing the ways in which they
allocate resources and returns. I shall argue that Japanesecorporations continue to pursue a strategy of retain
and reallocate, largely because of the strongpersistence of the institutions of lifetime employment and
cross-shareholding that have shapedJapanese corporate governance in the past. Nevertheless, in response to the
realities of the1990s, important changes are taking place in the ways people are employed and remunerated
inJapanese corporations. Working within the institutional framework of lifetime employment
andcross-shareholding, the challenge now facing Japanese industrial corporations is how to retainpeople as
productive employees for more years of their lives and how to reallocate these laborresources to make them
more productive. 
Institutions of Corporate Governance
Lifetime employment and cross-shareholding
The development of the Japanese economy before and during World War II was dominated bythe zaibatsu  --
large-scale enterprise groups generally under family ownership in which substantialstrategic and operational
responsibility had been delegated to salaried managers.13 During the1920s and 1930s, the development
strategy of the Japanese economy, and hence the investmentstrategies of the zaibatsu,  had become
increasingly driven by the investment requirements ofmilitarization and imperial expansion. When, following
World War II, the result was defeat anddevastation, both the Allied Occupation and the Japanese people held
the zaibatsu  families and their top managers largely to blame. The decision by the Supreme Commander of
the AlliedPowers (SCAP) to dissolve the zaibatsu met with little resistance. 
Beginning in August 1946, ownership of the stock of thirty zaibatsu  holding companies, including those of
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda -- the largest of the zaibatsu  -- was transferred to SCAP's Holding
Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC) to be redistributed to the public. At the same time, another 53
companies went through reorganizations so that they ceased to beholding companies. In addition, hundreds of
affiliated zaibatsu  companies were classified as "restricted concerns", and, under the supervision of HCLC,
ordered to dispose of their stocks. Inan attempt to ensure that the zaibatsu  business empires would not
reconstitute themselves, holding companies were made illegal and limitations -- five percent for most types of
enterprises,and ten percent for banks (later reduced to five percent) and life insurance companies -- were placed
on the amount of stock that one company could hold in another.14 
Overall 40 percent of all Japanese securities went through the liquidation process under SCAP,with the sale of
stock being handled by the Securities Coordinating Liquidation Committee(SCLC). Employees were given the
first right to buy stock issued by their companies. Manycompanies lent employees money to buy these stocks.
Next in line for the opportunity to buy thestocks were residents of localities in which the stock-issuing
company had production facilities. Stocks still left over were then placed on the securities market for sale. With
the stock marketsclosed from the end of the war, at first such market transfers had to proceed through
over-the-counter trading. In 1949 the stock exchanges were reopened, now, in contrast to the prewar era,as
non-profit organizations that forbade blatantly speculative business such as futures trading.15
The zaibatsu  dissolution process resulted in a wide diffusion of stockholding in Japan. But thereorganization
of ownership and control of Japanese corporations in the decade after World WarII went much deeper than a
transfer of stock ownership. Also purged under SCAP were the topmanagers of the major Japanese
corporations. Hidemasa Morikawa places the number ofmanagers who were forced to resign between 1945
and 1948 at about 5000, with the average ageof top managers of these companies falling from 60 to 50 over
this short period.16 Taking overcontrol of strategic decision-making in Japan's industrial enterprises were a
young group of "third-rank executives", so-called because they were plucked from the ranks of middle
management totake leadership positions. Commenting on these changes in stockholding and corporate
control,Yutaka Kosai has argued that "nowhere was the separation of management and ownership
morethoroughgoing than in postwar Japan."17 During the last half of the 1940s, however, the transformation of corporate control threatenedto go much
further as dire economic conditions and SCAP democratization initiatives gave riseto a militant labor movement
of white-collar (technical and administrative) and blue-collar(operative) employees. Union membership jumped
from 3.2 percent of the labor force in 1945to 41.5 percent in 1946, and then rose to as high as 55.8 percent in
1949.18 The goal of thenew industrial unions was to implement "production control": the takeover of idle
factories sothat workers could put them into operation and earn a living.19 
As an alternative to the "production control" strategy of militant unions, leading companiescreated the
institutional foundations of organizational control by establishing enterprise unionsof white-collar and
blue-collar employees. In 1950, under economic conditions deliberatelyrendered more severe by the
Occupation's anti-inflationary "Dodge line", companies such asToyota, Toshiba, and Hitachi fired militant
workers and offered enterprise unionism to theremaining employees. The post-Korean War recession of 1953
created another opportunityfor more companies to expel the militants and introduce enterprise unionism, which
by the mid-1950s had become an entrenched institution at all of the major Japanese industrial enterprises.20
Included as members of these enterprise unions were all male blue-collar(shop-floor) workers as long as they
remained employed by the company and all male white-collar (administrative and technical) workers for at least
ten years until they made the transitionto management.
The acceptance, and indeed promotion, of enterprise unionism by employers created apresumption that the
enterprise would be the entity responsible for providing employment securityto union members from the time
they were hired (usually straight from school) to the time theyretired (at the age of 55 in the postwar decades
but increasingly at the age of 60 since the 1980s). During the 1950s major industrial enterprises were willing
to extend the promise of long-termemployment to those members of their core labor forces on whom they
depended for thedevelopment and utilization of productive resources and on whom they could rely to stay in
thelabor force and with the company over the long-term. The successful growth of these majorindustrial
enterprises in general from the mid-1950s transformed the promise of long-termemployment into a
commitment to "lifetime employment" that by the 1970s had become afundamental institutional characteristic
of the Japanese economy.22
Lifetime employment did not, and still does not, have clear contractual status in Japan. Thelegal status of
"lifetime" employees is as "regular" (as distinct from "temporary") employees withno stated termination date in
their employment contracts. In 1995, out of an active labor forceof 47.8 million people, there were 37.6 million
regular employees in Japan, of whom 26.1million were male and 1.2 million female.21 Japanese labor law
protects employees againstwrongful dismissal, and in many disputed cases of permanent layoffs, the courts
have tendedto hold management responsible for ensuring that regular workers remain employed. 
Membership in an enterprise union has traditionally provided the best institutional protection forregular
employees to remain lifetime employees. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s onlyan estimated 35 percent of
the participants in the Japanese labor force were members ofenterprise unions, but that proportion included
virtually all male employees of the majorenterprises that were central to Japan's remarkable rise to industrial
power. Nevertheless,changes in economic and industrial structure combined with the upward mobility of more
andmore white-collar workers into the ranks of (non-union) management has led the proportion ofthe labor
force organized into enterprise unions to decline from 34 percent in 1975 to 31percent in 1980, 29 percent in
1985, 25 percent in 1990, and just over 23 percent in 1996. Inthe major companies, therefore, lifetime
employment also applies to many non-union regularemployees -- most notably, managerial employees, who
after a decade of employment with acompany are no longer union members. With enterprise unions embedded
in all the majorenterprises that have been at the center of Japan's remarkable economic success, theprevailing
ideology in Japan is that a company that has attained any substantial size must takeresponsibility for ensuring
the employment of the regular workers it hires until the time that theyretire.
Especially in the case of women, however, a regular employment contract does not necessarilyentail lifetime
employment. It is generally assumed that even those women who are regularemployees will drop out of the
full-time paid labor force at marriage and lose the status ofregular employee. Indeed, despite the growing labor
force participation rates for women, thetendency is still for women to leave paid labor when they have children.When the childrenhave grown, many return to the labor market, typically as "part-time" workers. A
part-timeworker, most of whom are women, is anyone who works less than 35 hours per week.
Being"part-time" they do not have access to many of the employment benefits of "regular" workers. Even if a
part-time worker stays with the company for a long period of time, she (or he) is notviewed as a lifetime
employee.24
What about employees of small and medium-sized companies that are subsidiary to corecompanies? In 1992,
unions represented 58 percent of the labor force in companies with 1000or more employees, 29 percent in
companies with 300 to 999 employees, five percent incompanies with 30 to 99 employees, and only 0.3 percent
in enterprises with less than 30 employees.25 But long-term relations between core companies and
subcontracting companies are central to Japanese industrial organization.26 A core company might hold out the
promiseof long-term relations with the subcontracting enterprise but does not take responsibility forensuring
the long-term employment of its workers. Nevertheless, the innovative strategies ofcore companies have
depended critically on building long-term relations with specificsubcontracting enterprises for the sake of
developing and utilizing technology. When successful, these innovative strategies have created the financial
returns to support lifetimeemployment not only in the core companies but also, de facto, in the
subcontractingcompanies, even though these companies do not normally have enterprise unions.27 Indeed,as
we shall see, through the transfer of the regular employees of core companies to suchsubsidiary companies
later in their careers, the relation between these two types of enterprisehas become increasingly important for
maintaining the promise of lifetime employment for corecompany employees as well.
In addition, as I shall also discuss, when a company is in financial trouble, it is the practice of the companies
with which it has business relations -- including, for smaller companies, trade creditors -- to seek to support its
recovery rather than condemn it to bankruptcy. The existence of lifetime employment in large companies is at
the core of a national system of corporate governance that places the responsibility on the business community
for keeping people employed and that encourages the business community to provide troubled companies with
the requisite financial support.
In the 1990s lifetime employment remains a powerful force in shaping the allocation of corporate resources
and returns in the Japanese economy. Just how deeply embedded the institution of lifetime employment is in
the Japanese corporate economy is demonstrated in an article, provocatively entitled "The Lifetime Employment
System Unravels," written in the fall of 1993 by Harumi Yamamoto, a reporter for the major daily newspaper,
Asahi Shimbun. At the outset, the author recognized that, despite the already prolonged recession of the 1990s,
"management's restructuring to date has had little impact on the bottom line . . . because of the persistence of
lifetime employment and promotion by seniority." He continued: 
These practices, traditionally followed by Japan's leading companies, make it impossible for
management to lay off workers at will, no matter what the cost of keeping them on might be to
a company's health. Companies overcame previous recessions by other measures, such as
furloughing workers, eliminating overtime, and cutting executive salaries. Blue-collar workers
were offered early retirement incentives, and these retirements were ostensibly voluntary,
rather than constituting forced separations. Work force adjustments rarely if ever extended to
white-collar workers. Managers might be shifted from managerial posts to sales positions or
be transferred temporarily to subsidiaries, but the lifetime employment system guaranteed
they would be kept at the company in some capacity.30
What then, in the recession of the 1990s, constituted the "unraveling" of lifetime employment? It was,
according to Yamamoto that, with white-collar workers making up more of the work force and with more of
these employees being older and hence more highly paid, "businesses have begun targeting white-collar
employees for separation bonus programs and other incentives to early retirement."31 Such unprecedented
corporate restructuring programs, he went on, "violate the spirit of the lifetime employment system."32 
The most egregious violation to date, Yamamoto reported, was the decision of Pioneer Electronic Company, in
January 1993, to demand that 35 managers in their fifties accept a company offer of early retirement or else befired. When this move was reported by the newspapers, "the plight of the managers caught national attention." 
The news proved profoundly disturbing to the Japanese public. As other media outlets picked
up and began following the story a sense of popular indignation and betrayal began to build.
Newspapers and television stations were flooded with letters and phone calls condemning
Pioneer and questioning whether the action violated labor laws. Pioneer had long been
regarded as one of Japan's elite companies and a most attractive place to work, and its
surprising action brought home to many just how serious the recession had actually
become.33
When interviewed by Asahi Shimbun  in February 1993, the president of Pioneer, recognized that 
the way in which the separation notices were given, telling the employees they would be
summarily discharged, gave the company a very cruel image, and that was unfortunate.
However, it is true that the employees were encouraged to resign. Virtual unemployment is not
only a burden on the company, it is also painful for employees who report to work day after
day with nothing meaningful to do. It is better for both Pioneer and these employees for them
to find another workplace where they are needed and where they can work with zest and
enthusiasm.34
As for the 35 Pioneer managers who were asked to resign, according to Yamamoto, "[they] viewed the
company's action as an inexcusable breach of trust. After all, they had sacrificed their private lives to do
whatever the company asked of them, only to be essentially fired with barely any warning." By mid-May 1993,
of 17 of the 35 employees interviewed by Asahi Shimbun,  13 had resigned but the other four were still
employed by Pioneer. Three of those interviewed were considering lawsuits, but recognized the costs and
delays that would be involved. Representatives of Pioneer's enterprise union, to which, being in their fifties, the
35 managers no longer belonged, said that the company's action "sullied its reputation and damaged work
morale."35
A survey in December 1992, just around the time Pioneer announced its job cuts, revealed that in the
manufacturing sector alone, over one million white-collar workers were "virtually unemployed", remaining on
company payrolls, but with little productive work to do. In the 1990s there has been a severe problem of an
overabundance of lifetime employees in their fifties who, under seniority pay systems, draw high salaries but
whose labor services are being underutilized.
Americans, in the 1990s, take corporate downsizing as a matter of course. One point of the Pioneer story for
Westerners, however, is that, even after three years of recession, the attempted firing of 35 corporate employees
can still provoke such a popular reaction in Japan. The other point of this story for Westerners is that Japanese
statements about the "unraveling" of lifetime employment need to be both treated cautiously and considered in
context. In responding to changing economic conditions, what has been at issue in Japan in the 1990s is not
the institution of lifetime employment; despite the prolonged recession of the 1990s, lifetime employment
remains intact.36
Nevertheless, as I shall elaborate later in this paper, during the 1990s, within the framework of lifetime
employment, Japanese corporations have adjusted how they reallocate both the labor services of workers in
their fifties (and, in a small but growing number of cases, workers in their sixties) and the rewards that these
workers receive. In doing so, the solution of early retirement plans, so popular as a more humane way of
downsizing the labor force in many American and European companies, has by no means become the norm in
Japan. On the contrary, as we shall also see, the persistence of the institution of lifetime employment means
that unions and governments have exerted effective pressure on companies to take responsibility for ensuring
that their lifetime employees keep working for more years than has traditionally been the case. Since the late
1970s the government has encouraged companies to raise the mandatory retirement age of their workers from
55 years old to 60 years old. A Ministry of Labor survey found that, in 1994, 78 percent companies of all sizes,
98 percent with 5000 or more employees, and 95 percent with between 1000 and 5000 employees had a
mandatory retirement age of 60. Eight percent of companies of all sizes, one percent with 5000 or moreemployees, and three percent with between 1000 and 5000 employees had a mandatory retirement age of over
60. The current policy of the government and the unions is to get companies to raise the mandatory retirement
age to 65 years old, although as of 1994 less than one percent of companies with over 1000 employees (but
seven percent of companies with 30 to 99 employees) had done so.37 
For a company to sustain a commitment to lifetime employment, especially as working "lifetimes" are
becoming a decade longer than was previously the case, requires that the corporate organization exercise
significant control over the allocation of its financial returns.38 In the postwar decades, cross-shareholding has
been the institution that has ensured that organizational control. It is an institution that was designed to ensure
-- and that continues to ensure -- that outsiders to the corporate organization, including first and foremost
public stockholders, will be unable to lay claim to the corporate surplus at the expense of insiders: the lifetime
employees.
Such organizational control was by no means assured after the dissolution of the zaibatsu.  In the aftermath of
the zaibatsu  dissolution and with the reopening of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1949, individuals owned 69
percent of outstanding stock, securities companies 13 percent, other financial institutions ten percent,
nonfinancial companies less than six percent, and the government less than three percent.39 To finance the
growth of their companies, enterprise managers needed to maintain as much control as possible over surplus
revenues, both for internal financing and to provide a financial base for taking on bank loans. In the United
States, organizational control over the allocation of surplus revenues had been accomplished earlier in the
century through the widespread distribution among the wealthholding public of the outstanding shares of
dominant enterprises.40 But in post-World War II Japan, subsequent to the dissolution of the zaibatsu,  the
undeveloped state of both enterprises and the stock markets left Japanese enterprises vulnerable to, if not
takeovers, demands on their earnings from outside interests.41 
To ensure that outsiders could not use stock ownership to gain access to company revenues that were needed
for internal finance and to service bank loans, the banks and the industrial companies, within and across
enterprise groups, took equities off the market by holding each other's shares. Increasingly, business relations
among companies, be they industrial or financial, became cemented by cross-shareholding arrangements, with a
company that had closer relations with another company being more likely to hold larger amounts of that
company's shares, up to the legal maximum of five percent of shares outstanding (ten percent in the case of
insurance companies). 
Over time, as business relations among financial and industrial enterprises changed, the web of
cross-shareholding became more intricate. Although cross-shareholding is not based on a legally enforceable
contract, the practice became widely established during the 1950s and 1960s as an institutional arrangement for
doing business in Japan. By 1955 cross- shareholding represented 25 percent of outstanding stocks listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and by 1960 it was about 40 percent. It declined slightly in the early 1960s. But
after the opening up of Japanese capital markets in 1964, when Japan joined the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the business community, fearing foreign takeovers, took steps to increase
cross-shareholding. By 1975, cross-shareholding absorbed 60 percent of outstanding stock, and since then has
risen to its current level of about 65 percent.42 
Besides the absorption of stock already on the market, Japanese corporations increased the overall level of
cross-shareholding during the 1950s and 1960s by offering existing stockholders rights issues at par and
stock dividends, as well as by distributing shares at par or free to other businesses. During this period, only
those shares not absorbed as rights issues were then sold to the public at market prices. It was not until the
early 1970s that Japanese companies began to offer new shares to existing stockholders as rights issues. This
practice of public equity offerings expanded considerably in the 1980s.43 
From 1949 to the 1990s, the proportion of stock outstanding held by individuals declined more or less
continuously while the proportions held by industrial corporations and financial institutions increased. In 1993,
of total stock outstanding, financial institutions held 45 percent (of which banks held 16 percent, trust
companies ten percent, and life insurance companies 13 percent), business corporations 24 percent, individualinvestors 24 percent, and foreign investors seven percent.44
As in the case of lifetime employment, the financial turmoil of the 1990s has led some observers to predict that
financial institutions would sell off their cross-shareholdings, and that the system would subsequently fall
apart. In particular, these observers have been looking for troubled banks to sell off their cross-shareholdings,
especially given the propensity of their major corporate clients to go directly to securities markets rather than
banks for money.45 For example, writing in the mid-1990s Minoru Nakamura and Koji Yamada, researchers at
Nomura Research Institute, wrote: 
As long as stock prices continued to rise as they had done in the second half of the 1980s,
[city and long-term credit] banks could justify their investments by increases in the unrealised
capital gains from their stock holdings. However, when stock prices collapsed early in the
1990s, they could no longer justify such stock investment. Worse yet, they had to realise the
hidden profits of their stock holdings to offset their charge-off on bad loans, with the result
that the financial capacity of these banks to hold shares for the purpose of cross-shareholding
has badly weakened. In other words, the relationship between issuers and their loyal
shareholders which had long been a characteristic of the Japanese stock market since the war
is now disintegrating with the weakening of the banking system.
In the late 1990s, as I shall discuss in detail, the banking system remains weak, if not weaker, than a few years
ago when Nakamura and Yamada wrote. But has cross-shareholding been disintegrating, as they claim? Strictly
on the numbers and using the conventional measure of the extent of cross-shareholding, there was a decrease
in the proportion of stocks that are cross-held of almost four percent in the first half of the 1990s. From 1989
to 1995, the proportion of outstanding stock of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange held by
financial institutions (excluding investment trusts) declined from 42.3 percent to 40.0 percent, while the
proportion held by non-financial business corporations fell from 24.8 percent to 23.5 percent. Most of the
proportionate increase in holdings was by foreigners, with a small increase also for individuals. 
Yet, given the financial turmoil of the 1990s, in which one would expect some significant financial restructuring
of Japanese banks, the grounds seem slim for asserting that the institution of cross- shareholding is
"disintegrating." Indeed, during the first half of the 1990s, banks' stockholdings as a proportion of their total
assets increased significantly. Between 1989 and 1995, securities as a proportion of total assets of all Japanese
banks rose from 14.0 percent to 15.5 percent, and stocks as a proportion of total securities held by these banks
rose from 23.5 percent to 35.1 percent, so that the proportion of stocks to total assets rose from 3.3 percent to
5.4 percent. For the city banks, whose business has historically been closely tied to the financing of industrial
corporations, over this period securities as a proportion of total assets rose from 10.7 percent to 12.4 percent,
and stocks as a proportion of total securities held by these banks rose from 30.9 percent to 48.5 percent, so
that the proportion of stocks to total assets rose from 3.3 percent to 6.0 percent.47
The example of one much-publicized sell-off of cross-shareholdings by a major bank -- the troubled
Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) -- provides some insights into the how limited sell-offs of
cross-shareholdings by banks have been. The sell-off occurred in 1996, after LTCB's profits had plunged into
the red during the previous year with losses of 110 billion yen.48 Contrary to the notion that banks were
engaged in selling off their cross-shareholdings during the first half of the 1990s, the LTCB sell-off was the
first to be undertaken by one of the major Japanese banks. Denying press reports that it would sell off up to
one-sixth of the market value of its stockholdings (about 500 billion yen), LTCB claimed that it would in fact
only be selling off a small (but unspecified) proportion. Bank officials claimed that they made the decision
"after we looked carefully at the very poor performance of these assets relative to others." Significantly, the
stocks that LTCB put up for sale were not those of industrial corporations but rather securities companies --
financial enterprises with which, as we shall see, LTCB will be increasingly in competition as Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto's recently initiated "Financial Big Bang" unfolds.49 
A key indicator of the persistence of cross-shareholding as a prime institution of Japanese corporate
governance is the low dividend yield on corporate stock through the 1990s. In the 1950s the dividend yield
(dividends, including stock dividends and splits, as a percentage of the market price of the stock) on TSE FirstSection stocks was between six and seven percent. It then declined steadily to around four percent during the
1960s, two percent during the 1970s, and under one percent in the 1980s.50 With the prices of stocks soaring
in the late 1980s, the dividend yield dropped to an all-time low of 0.39 percent in 1989. As the Nikkei stock
price average fell from over 38,000 in 1989 to under 20,000 in 1995, the dividend yield recovered to about 0.70
percent, with actual dividend payments being cut in the recession of the early 1990s. Over the period
1990-1994, dividend yields on corporate stock averaged 0.75 percent in Japan, 3.02 percent in the United
States, and 4.58 percent in Germany.51
With the implementation of further financial liberalization in Japan, financial interests will undoubtedly exert
more pressure on industrial corporations to pay out higher dividends. Whether and under what conditions this
pressure will be effective in breaking down the wall of cross- shareholding so that portfolio investors can gain
access to corporate revenues is a matter that I shall discuss in the concluding section of this paper. Suffice it to
say that thus far through the 1990s dividend levels on corporate stock show no sign of rising. Like lifetime
employment, the institution of cross-shareholding remains intact.
The system of corporate governance 
Together, lifetime employment and cross-shareholding form the institutional foundations for the operation of
the Japanese system of corporate governance, with cross-shareholding making the persistence of lifetime
employment possible (although not necessarily viable). Lifetime employment means that the company takes
responsibility for a certain class of employees from the time they are hired to the time they retire. By ensuring
that the returns of the enterprise can be devoted to reinvestment in the productive capabilities of these
employees and the capital equipment that they can use, cross-shareholding provides a foundation of financial
commitment for the pursuit of the enterprise's employment objectives.
From the perspective of the Anglo-American agency theory of the firm that contends that corporations should
be governed in the interests of stockholders without regard to the interests of employees, the institutions of
cross-shareholding and lifetime employment make the Japanese system appear to be what one scholar has
termed "anti-governance".52 Such a perspective ignores the corporate governance implications of the
institutionalization of the commitment to deliver lifetime employment as the fundamental objective of the
Japanese enterprise. The commitment to lifetime employment accentuates the need for active corporate
governance in the allocation of resources and returns. The corporation must develop and utilize its productive
resources, including its human resources, in ways that enable it to generate the returns on a sustainable basis
that can keep its labor force employed at acceptable standards of living. The prime tasks for Japanese corporate
governance are the allocation of human resources and the returns to human resources so as to achieve such
sustainable productivity. Within the rigidity imposed by the commitment to lifetime employment, such
corporate governance requires considerable flexibility in the allocation of resources and returns.53
The Japanese system of corporate governance is an intensely hierarchical structure, with ultimate strategic
decision-making being the prerogative of an executive board of top managers, of whom the president is the
most powerful figure. Many of these top managers also sit on the company's board of directors. Among the
largest Japanese companies, about one-tenth of the directors are employed by other corporations that are major
shareholders of the company and with which the company has extensive business relations. Another one-fifth
of the directors are full-time managers with the company who have pursued most of their careers with other
companies or government agencies but have been permanently transferred.54 Typically, banks, business
enterprises, and government agencies have each supplied about one-third of these part-time and full-time
"dispatched directors", with banks generally having no more than one such director with any one industrial or
commercial enterprise at a time. The rest of the directors, including the company auditors, are lifetime company
employees or former employees. 
The meetings of the boards of directors, therefore, are in effect executive management meetings, and any
independent supervisory function that the board of directors as such might supposedly serve is merely
ceremonial. Even more of a ritual are stockholders' meetings, held once a year. Legally, top managers and the
board of directors are responsible to stockholders, who, according to the Japanese Commercial Code have the
right to elect directors, approve the annual balance sheet, and decide dividends, as well as approve other issuesdecided by top management such as gifts of stocks to companies for business purposes. 
But who are the stockholders, what are their objectives, and how can they exert their influence? The essence of
cross-shareholding, which accounts for about two out of every three shares, is the willingness of participant
companies to be stable shareholders. Except under conditions of financial duress, a Japanese company does
not sell the stock of another company that it holds as a stable investor. Even when it does sell the stock, the
buyer is another stable shareholder and the seller is expected to repurchase the stock when it regains its
financial strength. Stable shareholders do not typically come to stockholders' meetings, but routinely give their
proxy votes to the top managers of the companies in which the shares are held. Besides eschewing capital
gains and control rights, as we have seen, stable shareholders, as participants in the web of cross-shareholding,
have also, over time, been increasingly willing to accept low levels of dividend yields, given the market value of
the stock that they hold. Given these demonstrated objectives and actions of stable shareholders, Japanese
cross-shareholding in effect represents a system whereby the Japanese business community protects the power
of corporate managers to control the allocation of the resources and returns of the companies for which they
have executive responsibility. In contrast to stable shareholders, individuals or institutional investors who hold
their stocks only for the sake of the financial returns that these stocks can yield tend to be "unstable"
stockholders. Those stockholders who would like the opportunity to exercise their voice find that they are
given little chance to do so. It has long been the practice for Japanese companies to hold their stockholders'
meetings at the same time on the same day each year. For example, on June 27, 1996, 94 percent of 1,864 listed
companies held their stockholders on the same day, and most at the same time. It is thus difficult, if not
impossible, for the activist stockholder to influence more than one company per year. Save for uncontrollable
interruptions, meetings rarely last more than half an hour; the average for the 1,766 companies that held their
meetings on June 27, 1996 was 26 minutes.55 Even the June 27th shareholders' meeting of Sumitomo
Corporation, which had revealed two weeks before that one of its London copper traders had hidden losses of
$1.8 billion over the previous decade, lasted only 38 minutes, with (according to the Nikkei Weekly report)
"only one question [being] allowed and it was not directly answered."56 
One way in which many Japanese companies have eliminated embarrassing questions at stockholders'
meetings is to pay blackmail to professional sokaiya, often linked to the underworld yakusa, who approach
management beforehand with the threat that they will ask such questions. Having been paid, the sokaiya will
often then come to the stockholders' meetings to return the favor to management by ensuring, through
intimidation, that other stockholders do not step out of line. A 1982 government reform that sought to limit the
influence of sokaiya resulted in a number of major companies experiencing marathon stockholders' meetings, of
which the longest was Sony's (subsequent to the displacement of its proprietary Betamax system by the VHS
format) at thirteen and a half hours.57 In the 1980s the government made it illegal for managers to make
blackmail payments to sokaiya, but as evidenced by the sokaiya scandals of 1997, many major Japanese
enterprises still engage in the practice.58
Since the prevalence of cross-shareholdings and control over shareholders' meetings block unstable
stockholders from reaping financial returns in the form of dividend yields, the only way in which they can
generate financial returns is through stock-price appreciation. The Nikkei stock price average (which reflects
the prices of 225 stocks listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange) appreciated gradually during
the 1950s, stagnated during the 1960s, and then, save for declines in 1974 and 1975 in the aftermath of the Oil
Crisis, rose at a relatively rapid pace until 1982. After a small decline in 1983 to about 7000, the Nikkei
exploded over the next six years to a peak of 38,915 at the end of 1989. Subsequently, of course, it crashed,
falling as low as 14,309 in September 1992, and as of mid-January 1998 remained hovered around 16,000. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, even as the dividend yields on stock fell from around three percent to
well under one percent, unstable stockholders were kept happy by the runup in the market prices of corporate
equities. As for stable shareholders, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but particularly in the "bubble" period of
the late 1980s, they declined to cash in on the rise of other  companies' stocks. At the same, time, however,
Japanese industrial enterprises engaged in the practice of selling large quantities of their own  stocks to the
public at inflated market prices either directly in the form of equities or indirectly in the form of convertible
bonds. As can be seen in Table 1, beginning in the early 1970s, but especially in the late 1980s, Japanese companies
raised large amounts of funds through public issues of stocks. Meanwhile the volume of conversions of bonds
to stocks (some but not all of which ended up in the hands on unstable shareholders) was high throughout the
period. In addition, during the 1980s Japanese companies issued large volumes of warrant bonds -- bonds with
rights (or warrants) to buy stock attached -- that were mainly floated abroad. In the late 1980s large amounts of
warrants were exercised, accounting for 16 percent of the number of new shares issued by listed Japanese
corporations between 1987 and 1989 (see Table 2).
Table 1. Paid-In Funds Raised by Offerings of Listed Stocks on All
Japanese Stock Exchanges, 1965-1994 
















1965 100 1429 98.1 0.1 1.8
1966 223 1938 94.0 1.2 4.9
1967 234 2528 95.9 3.0 1.0
1968 230 3241 95.0 3.6 1.4
1969 388 5296 87.8 11.2 0.9
1970 374 6613 80.0 19.1 1.0
1971 249 5410 71.8 18.3 9.9
1972 429 12982 26.6 66.3 7.0
1973 315 7314 41.3 53.6 5.1
1974 322 6125 58.3 40.8 1.0
1975 219 9024 71.9 27.0 1.1
1976 284 8115 34.5 64.2 1.3
1977 332 7095 30.2 65.7 4.1
1978 250 10329 29.8 64.1 6.1
1979 253 6605 19.4 70.3 10.3
1980 256 11601 15.2 78.1 6.7
1981 285 17932 26.8 71.4 1.8
1982 172 10154 18.3 79.4 2.4
1983 126 8495 16.7 65.6 17.8
1984 153 8148 8.5 87.2 4.2
1985 131 6513 28.7 67.2 4.2
1986 110 6315 19.0 75.1 6.0
1987 149 20839 22.9 71.7 5.3
1988 236 45638 21.8 76.0 2.2
1989 325 75600 13.7 82.8 3.5
1990 98 6646 42.0 29.7 28.2
1991 60 3427 61.5 9.7 28.9
1992 34 1517 37.7 5.4 57.0
1993 16 1883 0.1 28.6 71.3
1994 42 4722 10.2 30.3 59.5Notes:  Rights issues are stock issues to existing shareholders, which were
generally at par value before the 1980s, but increasingly at price between par
and the market price during the 1980s.
Public issues are stock issues to the general public at the prevailing market
price.
Private issues are placements of stock, typically below market price, to
"selected persons having some special relationship with the company, such
as its directors, employees, banking institutions with which the company
deals, its suppliers, or distributors." (Japan Securities Research Institute,
Securities Market in Japan, 1996, JSRI, 1996, 41.) 
Sources: Japan Securities Research Institute, Securities Market in Japan,
1984, JSRI, 1984, 28; Japan Securities Research Institute, Securities Market
in Japan, 1996, JSRI, 1996, 43. 
Table 2. Types of New Share Issues of Listed Japanese Corporations,

















1975 66.7 3.5 0.4 3.7 0.0 21.6 0.4 3.8
1976 36.0 11.2 0.6 10.0 0.0 36.7 3.4 2.0
1977 46.7 11.3 1.7 5.0 0.0 32.6 2.1 0.6
1978 32.1 14.4 6.0 13.5 0.0 34.2 1.9 -2.1 
1979 20.5 16.0 3.3 25.5 0.0 31.8 0.5 2.4
1980 19.1 17.6 3.4 24.0 0.0 35.5 0.1 0.4
1981 39.5 16.6 0.7 17.8 0.0 24.5 0.4 0.5
1982 20.3 18.5 1.2 11.6 0.1 44.6 0.3 3.3
1983 11.9 6.1 7.0 23.7 1.4 44.2 5.5 0.3
1984 12.3 8.2 3.4 29.8 2.2 38.1 4.3 1.8
1985 9.0 5.9 1.2 34.9 4.4 37.6 6.0 0.9
1986 4.1 3.8 0.9 31.2 9.7 36.8 6.7 6.9
1987 4.4 5.8 2.5 38.3 18.3 26.4 0.2 4.1
1988 6.5 9.8 1.3 35.2 16.1 30.0 0.4 0.7
1989 4.4 19.3 0.5 30.0 13.5 30.1 1.9 0.2
1990 5.2 8.8 1.7 12.7 4.0 30.3 26.3 11.1
1991 6.3 0.6 2.8 9.1 5.4 * 52.0 23.8
1992 8.9 0.1 6.9 5.0 6.9 * 57.3 15.0
1993 2.4 0.1 13.1 9.5 18.8 * 24.7 31.4
1994 0.5 0.7 10.8 8.8 9.6 * 46.1 23.6
1995 8.9 0.4 17.5 12.2 12.1 * 36.2 12.8
1996 8.6 3.8 11.1 9.6 15.2 * 16.1 36.6
Notes:  For definitions of rights, public, and private issues, see notes to Table
1. Conversions are common stock issues in exchange for convertible bonds
or preferred shares. Warrants are stock issues in exchange for the warrants
attached to warrant bonds.
Gratis issues are stock dividends or the issue of par value shares by
incorporating legal reserves or premiums over par of previous stock issues
into the company's capital.
Stock splits are the conversion of outstanding stocks into non-par shares.
Under the amended Commercial Code, effective, April 1, 1992, "gratis" issues
are deemed to be stock splits. Hence, for 1991 through 1996 (as signified by
* in the table), gratis issues are included in stock splits.
Other issues include share increases or decreases as a result of mergers or
reductions in capital stock.
Sources: Tokyo Stock Exchange, Annual Securities Statistics, 1990, TSE,1990, 136-137;
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Annual Securities Statistics, 1996, TSE, 1996,
142-143. 
Given these sales of equities, much of which ended up in the hands of unstable shareholders, how then did
Japanese corporations maintain the levels of cross-shareholding at about 65 percent during the 1980s? As
indicated in Table 2, they distributed massive amounts of stock to stable shareholders as rights issues, private
placements, as "offerings to selected persons" for business purposes, and as stock dividends. According to
Zielinski and Holloway, writing in 1989, "around 40 percent of the money raised in the equity market is
eventually plowed back into the stock market in answer to reciprocal calls for cash from cross-shareholders."
Thus, while during the late 1980s the public was buying up shares of Japanese companies at price-earnings
ratios that averaged about 58 in 1987 and 1988 and 71 in 1989, Japanese companies were ensuring that stable
shareholders who sought neither capital gains nor high dividend yields would continue to hold a marked
majority of their outstanding stock.
Protected by cross-shareholding, corporate governance in Japanese companies is firmly under the control of
inside managers, supported by the inside managers of other Japanese financial and nonfinancial companies,
subject to the basic condition that as individual companies and as a group they maintain their commitment to
keeping the core of their labor forces employed over the course of their working careers. The absence of
stockholder power in Japanese companies does not mean that top managers can do just as they please in the
allocation of corporate resources and returns. Despite the financial commitment provided by cross-
shareholding, during the post-World War II decades, Japanese industrial companies were highly dependent on
bank finance. During the era of high-speed growth in the 1950s and 1960s, retained earnings were hardly
sufficient to fund the investments in technology and organization that this industrial development required. To
supplement retained earnings, companies were able to turn to a highly regulated banking system that, since the
Meiji era, had been structured to provide financial commitment for industrial development.
The prime mode of bank finance of industrial development in the post-World War II decades took the form of
the "main bank system" A company's "main bank" is the financial institution that takes the lead in providing it
with loan finance, even though much if not most of the loans are made to the company by other financial
institutions. By taking responsibility for monitoring the performance of the company and for leading the
rescue of the company should it fall into financial distress, the main bank permits other banks to make loans to
the company without having to take on these functions themselves. The result is that, based on the reputation of
the main bank and its close relationship with a particular company, a de facto loan syndicate finances the
company. 
The origins of this system can be traced to the early 1930s, when the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank
of Japan (BOJ) linked up with the government-controlled Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) and the most
powerful zaibatsu bank, Mitsui, to rescue 20 large companies that were in deep financial trouble. In the build
up to and during World War II loan syndication was widely used to finance "national policy firms", with IBJ
as the main bank in 82 of 121 loan syndicates. This method of financing continued after the war, first with
BOJ acting as an active organizer of loan syndicates, but then from 1950 with the city banks (formerly
connected with the major zaibatsu) and IBJ (now reorganized as a joint-stock company but initially supported
by MOF) taking the lead. In addition, during the 1950s, to complement IBJ, the government supported the
emergence of two other non-depository long-term credit banks -- the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan and the
Nippon Credit Bank -- with MOF using postal savings deposits to absorb their debenture issues and BOJ
supplying them with preferential credits. Indeed, throughout the postwar decades MOF and BOJ continued to
support the banking system in these ways, but in the early 1950s they played critical roles in enabling the city
banks and long-term credit banks to provide the financial commitment that launched the high-growth era.
The result of this form of financial commitment under the main bank system was that Japanese industrial
corporations could engage in developmental investment strategies with debt-equity ratios far in excess of those
that existed in the advanced economies of the West, and with debt financing that was almost entirely in the
form of unsecuritized bank loans as opposed to securitized bonds. In 1960, bank loans accounted for 65
percent of the financing of large Japanese enterprises, whereas bonds accounted for less than seven percent,
paid-in capital 14 percent, and reserves 14 percent. For the period 1962-1979, bank loans as a percent of allsources of funds to the non-financial corporate sector were 45 percent in Japan, 19 percent in the United States,
24 percent in Germany, and 21 percent in Britain. During the second half of the 1970s, Japanese bank finance
declined to 42 percent of all sources of funds to non- financial corporations, down from 50 percent during the
first half of the decade, a trend away from bank finance that continued during the 1980s. Yet even during the
1980s, bank loans as a percent of all non-financial corporate funds were 34 percent in Japan, 15 percent in the
United States, 19 percent in Germany, and 21 percent in Britain. 
Besides the Industrial Bank of Japan, the most important main banks are the city banks that are part of the Big
Six enterprise groups (kigyo shudan). These enterprise groups are also called horizontal keiretsu because they
link together a number of powerful companies across an array of distinct industries. The city banks of these
groups are the recently merged Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, Sakura Bank (another merger of the 1990s
that includes the former Mitsui Bank), Sumitomo Bank, Fuji Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, and Sanwa Bank.
Three of these banks had been part of the oldest and most powerful zaibatsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
Sumitomo, that, in the early 1950s, after the zaibatsu dissolution, built on the legacy of interfirm relations to
reorganize themselves into enterprise groups. SCAP had banned the formal re-emergence of the zaibatsu
groupings, but after the official end of the Allied occupation in April 1952, the groups of companies that had
previously constituted Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo resumed the use of the traditional zaibatsu names. By
the 1970s the other three powerful horizontal keiretsu -- Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangin, and Sanwa -- emerged around
Fuji Bank (formerly part of Yasuda zaibatsu), Dai-Ichi Kangyo, and Sanwa, respectively. 
In 1987, the non-financial enterprises that were part of the Big Six horizontal keiretsu included 163 parent, or
core, companies, 4,960 subsidiaries (in which the group held more than 50 percent of the stock), and 6,875
affiliates (in which the group held between 10 percent and 50 percent of the stock). The core companies alone
accounted for 13 percent of assets and 15 percent of sales in the Japanese economy, and with all of the
subsidiaries and affiliates, 27 percent of assets and 25 percent of sales. Each of these enterprise groups has a
President's Council, at which the presidents of the parent companies in the group (ranging from 20 companies
in the Sumitomo council to 47 companies in Dai-Ichi Kangin council) get together to discuss matters of
common concern, but without having legal means to enforce member enterprises to act as part of a collectivity. 
In addition, during the postwar decades a number of companies such as Toyota and Matsushita emerged as the
core companies of vertical keiretsu. As such, each of these core companies have provided development finance
to large numbers of subsidiaries that supply it with goods and services, either directly or through a chain of
suppliers and distributors. These core companies often provide substantial finance, both in the form of equity
stakes in and loans to these subsidiaries. To make matters more complicated, many of the core companies of
the vertical keiretsu have relations with the horizontal keiretsu. And whether the relations among companies be
vertical or horizontal, both cross-shareholding and bank lending transcend keiretsu relations, and have become
inextricable from the dense web of business relations that tie the fates of Japanese companies together.
Much has been made by students of the "main bank system" of the role of the main banks in monitoring
corporate management in an industrial economy in which companies are clearly not run for stockholders.
During the 1950s and 1960s, when the Japanese economy, and the industrial companies that constituted its
developmental core, faced uncertain futures, main banks did have to know to whom they were making financial
commitments. As the financial institution obliged to lead the effort to revitalize an ailing company, personnel at
the main bank had to understand the long-run potential of a company if and when circumstances placed it
under financial duress.
But by the 1970s and 1980s, once the Japanese economy and its core companies had overcome the inherent
uncertainties of the developmental process, the monitoring role of the main banks became virtually routine.
Indeed, so as not to be overly dependent on any one main bank, strong industrial companies sought bank loans
from an even greater range of sources than had previously been the case, or, they used retained earnings or
funds raised on securities markets to pay off large amounts of their bank debt. Awash with cash and having
lost their best customers, the banks then turned to making loans to real-estate developers and stock speculators,
among others. After the "bubble economy" burst in 1990, the collapse of land and stock markets left the
banking system with a massive bad loan problem.
As Shigeru Watanabe sums up the implications of the 1980s and early 1990s for the role of bank influence onthe major industrial corporations:
In the process, the banks lost their clout as a key element of corporate governance of Japanese companies.
Even if they had not lost their prestige with the bursting of the speculative bubble, the banks would have been
eased out of their dominant position in the corporate governance of Japanese firms, given the changes in the
flow of funds caused by the end of the fund shortages and freer access to the financial and capital markets,
because the leverage they have enjoyed in corporate governance came from the lender's power; when the
borrower's position has strengthened, that power has gone forever.
Watanabe, a researcher at the Nomura Research Institute, then states in typical "principal-agent" fashion: 
But nothing has replaced the banks. Now that equity-linked financing has come to take on the largest weight
among the corporate financing vehicles, shareholders should impose discipline on corporations. However, they,
including institutional investors, are not up to the task.
Such a view is based on a perspective that a company should be run for the sake of financial interests, be they
debtholders or stockholders Yet, even when, in earlier decades, the Japanese banks did have more power over
how the industrial corporations to which they lent allocated their resources and returns, they were actors in a
highly regulated financial system in which, given the uncertainties involved, they were willing to take relatively
low returns on their lending activities to support the success of the industrial economy. One reason that, as
financial enterprises, banks were willing to participate in such a system is that they knew, as the experience of
the 1990s has proved to be the case, that the government stood behind them should the loans go bad. 
As central participants in the cross-shareholding movement, moreover, the banks themselves were not run for
the sake of their stockholders, but for the sake of developing the economy. At the enterprise level, developing
the economy meant delivering on the promise of lifetime employment, not only to their own employees but to
the employees of the industrial enterprises that the banks helped to finance. It was the successful development
of these industrial enterprises that transformed lifetime employment from a promise to a reality in the postwar
Japanese economy. As part of a dynamic process of development, the institution of lifetime employment gave
top managers the incentive to develop and utilize the capabilities of the company's employees, while making the
delivery of lifetime employment a prime corporate objective. 
The fact is that Japanese corporations have been, and continue to be, governed by their top managers as part of
a hierarchical structure of organizational control. Within the management structure itself key allocations
decisions are generally made by a process of consensus decision making that includes the formal ringi seido
that involves the circulation of a memorandum to be signed by all concerned and the informal nemawashi that
seeks out differences of opinion and generates discussion before an important decision is made. Top
management ultimately makes the allocation decisions but, prior to the taking of an important decision, a
process exists to tap the knowledge and experience of those responsible for implementation. This discussion
extends down the hierarchy to the enterprise unions through joint consultation committees (JCCs) that involve
labor and management. Having themselves come up through the company and having been members of the
union during the early parts of their careers, most top managers have experienced JCCS from the labor side.
For example, a 1978 survey by Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations) found that two out of
three of the major companies had executives -- accounting for almost one in six executives -- who had at one
time served the company as union officials. Union officials, who are company employees, hold regularly
scheduled conferences with management at different levels of the enterprise to resolve issues concerning
remuneration, work conditions, work organization, interdepartmental and intercompany transfers, and
production. In contrast to the institutions of works councils and co-determination in Germany, Japanese
enterprise unions have no explicit rights to engage in the executive or supervisory institutions of corporate
governance. Rather, in large companies, JCCs perform an information-gathering function for both management
and labor that is a preliminary to collective bargaining. In smaller companies in which enterprise unions are
absent, JCCs actually constitute collective bargaining.
A 1994 survey of the activities of JCCs in large companies found that 69 percent of companies with 5000 or
more employees, and 77 percent of companies with 1000 to 4999 employees used JCCS to report and explain
basic business policy to workers. But on most issues only nine to 12 percent of the companies reported thatthey listened to workers' opinions, and only three to seven percent of companies said that they needed the
consent of workers to implement a change. On the introduction of new equipment, however, not only did
managers in 56 percent of the smaller companies (1000-4999 employees) report and explain the introduction
of new equipment to workers, but over 21 percent of the companies listened to workers' opinions. But a meager
1.3 percent of these companies said that they needed the consent of workers to introduce new equipment.
JCCs, therefore, can make management aware of what labor wants, but they certainly do not give labor the
power to influence the allocations of resources and returns against the wishes of top management. Since the
1970s overt and prolonged strife has been become virtually nonexistent in the major companies largely because
of the adherence of management to the principle of lifetime employment and a willingness of management,
behind the wall of cross- shareholding, to share the gains of enterprise with workers when they are available.
Enterprise unions, whose officials are members of management, enforce workers' claims on enterprise
earnings, taking into account the financial condition of the enterprise in relation to the requirements for
reinvestment. Within the framework of lifetime employment and cross- shareholding, workers have been
willing to restrain their demands for pay increases on the understanding that what they do not take now the
enterprise will invest in ways that will benefit them later. Guiding this wage bargaining at the enterprise level is
the benchmark for wage increases created by shunto, or the Spring Offensive, the annual national debate over
the condition of the economy and the consequent possibilities for augmenting the earnings of Japanese
employees without jeopardizing the sustained prosperity of their companies or the economy. 
The other key issue for the enterprise unions is whether to cooperate with management in its plans for the
reallocation of labor, especially when as, in the recession of the 1990s, to keep people employed over a lifetime
means putting them in jobs where they can generate the productivity that can justify their pay. For workers in
their twenties, thirties, and forties, the key to labor allocation is integration of workers into a process of
organizational learning that enables them to become more productive as under the seniority pay system (nenko)
they receive higher earnings. When they reach their fifties, however, the key to the process of labor allocation is
the transfer of workers to jobs where they can live off their experience but often at lower pay. Central to this
process in major companies has been the transfer of workers to subsidiary enterprises, a process that, as we
shall see in the last section of this paper, has in the 1990s become much more central to the maintenance of
lifetime employment as an institution that has a profound influence on Japanese corporate governance. 
Financial Pressures in the 1990s
The banking crisis
During the post-World War II decades, the Japanese erected a highly regulated financial system that was
extremely effective in supporting the development of the Japanese economy. Into the 1990s the system was
characterized by a range of highly specialized private-sector institutions whose financing activities were
supported by MOF through its Trust Fund Bureau and BOJ over which MOF exercises considerable control.
With all financial vehicles moving in the same direction and at the same pace under MOF, the "convoy fleet
system" (gososendan) became the popular name for the Japanese financial infrastructure.
Making finance available to Japanese business enterprises into the 1990s were: three long-term credit banks
that have made long-term loans to major industrial enterprises; seven trust banks and 27 life insurance
companies that have also made long-term loans to large companies, but which increasingly since the 1980s
have absorbed corporate government securities, both domestic and foreign; 11 city banks (centered in Tokyo,
Osaka, and Nagoya) that have made ostensibly short-term loans, many of which have been continually rolled
over to finance long-term investments, to major companies; 64 regional banks spread out over Japan's 47
prefectures that have extended loans to larger regional businesses; 66 second-tier regional banks that have
catered to the financial needs of small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs); and large numbers of credit
unions and credit associations that have extended loans to small enterprises and farmers. 
BOJ has supported this system of business finance by both maintaining a structure of low and stable interest
rates and by extending "overloans" to banks, especially the city banks, so that, by "overborrowing", they could
increase their volume of business loans beyond that permitted by their deposit base. MOF's Trust Fund
Bureau, which controls the investment of Japan's postal savings deposits and public pension funds, hassupported the system through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, also known as zaito, by financing
infrastructural investments, SMEs, and public works (including housing) and by absorbing the debentures of
long-term credit banks (which have no depository base, other than their corporate customers) and other
financial institutions. In addition, zaito draws on funds that the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
controls in the postal insurance system. 
Zaito must generate sufficient returns to cover the savings, pension, and insurance obligations to households
for the funds that it uses. But these rates are kept low by Japan's regulated interest rate structure, and MOF and
BOJ coordinate their policies and operations. Zaito functions as a second or shadow government spending
budget, but one that does not rely on either tax revenues or public debt issues. During the first half of the
1980s, investments and loans made with zaito funds were about 50 percent of the government's general account
appropriations. This proportion increased sharply in the 1990s, as depositors shifted their accounts from banks
to postal savings, and as the government used zaito to try to fight the recession. In 1994 zaito funds injected
into the economy were equal to 65 percent of government spending from the general account.
As indicated in Table 3, in terms of the distribution of financial assets across these institutions in 1993, Trust
Fund Bureau and city banks, followed by the regional banks, dominated in loans, while Trust Fund Bureau,
trust banks, and life insurance companies dominated in securities. 
Table 3. Financial Assets of Japanese Financial Institutions, March 31, 1993
-------------trillion yen------------- ------------percent of------------
Institution Loans Securities Assets loans securities
assets







Trust banks 59.8 76.5 136.3 6.3 17.7 9.9
Life insurance companies 61.1 67.4 128.5 6.5 15.6 9.3
Non-life insurance companies 7.2 12.3 19.5 0.8 2.8 1.4
City banks 223.2 46.5 269.7 23.6 10.8 19.5
Regional banks 126.5 32.5 159.0 13.4 7.5 11.5
Second-tier regional banks 50.9 9.5 60.4 5.4 2.2 4.4
Credit assoc. & unions 93.5 22.6 116.1 9.9 5.2 8.4
Agricultural institutions 41.0 29.0 70.0 4.3 6.7 5.1Postal insurance 25.9 29.8 55.7 2.7 6.9 4.0
Trust Fund Bureau 210.4 92.2 302.6 22.2 21.3 21.9
Total 947.1 432.5 1379.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Minoru Nakamura and Koji Yamada, "Financial Institutions of Japan," in Shigenobu Hayakawa, ed.,
Japanese Financial Markets, Gresham Books, 1996, 125.
Having supported the development of the Japanese economy in the post-World War II decades, during the
1990s this highly coordinated and regulated financial system has fallen into crisis. In all of these financial
institutions, the first half of the 1990s witnessed a mounting accumulation of bad loans. In March 1992, MOF
revealed the extent of the bad-loan problem, and the BOJ cut the discount rate to an all-time low of 1.75 percent
in order to help debtors make their payments. Nevertheless, the volume of bad loans continued to increase, and
financial institutions began to write off large amounts.
In September 1995, bad loans were 5.4 percent of all loans of all banks and cooperative institutions, of which
3.5 percent were loans of bankrupt companies or loans that were past due by more than six months, while the
other 1.9 percent were loans that had been restructured at a reduced rate of interest (see Table 4). Hardest hit in
terms of bad loans as a proportion of all loans were the long-term credit banks (7.3 percent) and the trust
banks (10.2 percent). But, given the size of their loan portfolios, the bad loans were concentrated in the city
banks, which accounted for 35.7 percent of all bad loans in the private-sector financial system. Even though the
trust banks had a relatively low proportion of their total assets in loans, they also had the lowest level of loan
loss reserve and hidden reserve coverage among the major bank lenders. 
Table 4. Bad Loans of Banks and Cooperatives, September 1995
---------trillion yen--------- --------------------percent--------------------
A L B L/A B/A B/L (R+H)/B B/Total B
City banks 433.2 275.7 13.6 63.6 3.1 4.9 90.4 35.7
LTCBs 87.3 54.5 4.0 62.4 4.6 7.3 87.5 10.5
Trust banks 250.8 61.5 6.3 24.5 2.5 10.2 50.8 16.5
Subtotal 771.3 391.8 23.8 50.8 3.1 6.1 79.8 62.5
Regional banks 200.2 133.9 5.0 66.9 2.5 3.7 128.0 13.1
2nd regional banks 68.8 51.0 2.8 74.1 4.1 5.5 50.0 7.3
Regional banks total 269.0 184.9 7.8 68.7 2.9 4.2 100.0 20.5
Total banks 1040.4 576.7 31.6 55.4 3.0 5.5 84.8 82.9
Cooperatives 263.9 129.1 6.5 48.9 2.5 5.0 47.7 17.1
TOTAL 1304.3 705.8 38.1 54.1 2.9 5.4 78.5 100.0
A = assets, L = loans, B = bad loans, R = loan loss reserve, H = hidden reserve (difference between market
value and book value of stockholdings)
Source: Akitoshi Takatsuki, "Money and Banking in Japan," International Management, InternationalUniversity of Japan, photocopy, October 1996.
In March 1997 total bad loans for Japanese banks were estimated at 28 trillion yen, up from 22 trillion yen in
March 1996 and 13 trillion yen in March 1995. A significant proportion of these bad loans had been made to
jusen housing loan companies that were incorporated by banks, insurance companies, and securities companies
in the 1970s for the purpose of making housing loans to individuals. The jusen themselves used funds
borrowed from the financial institutions. But in the 1980s many of the banks turned to making housing loans
themselves, thus leading the jusen to turn instead to financing real estate development projects. When, in 1990,
at the onset of the financial crisis, MOF introduced regulations that limited bank loans to real estate companies
and nonbank lenders, the jusen turned to the cash-rich agricultural cooperatives. 
As land prices continued to plummet in the early 1990s, the jusen loans went bad. In September 1995, seven
jusen companies had 12.9 trillion yen in loans outstanding, of which about two-thirds were problem loans.
About 48 percent of these borrowings came from banks (of which over one-third was from trust banks) and
another 42 percent from agricultural cooperatives. At the end of 1995 MOF ordered the banks that had
founded the jusen companies to write off all of their loans (3.5 trillion yen) to affiliated jusen and 45 percent of
their loans (1.7 trillion yen) to non-affiliated jusen. MOF contributed 685 billion yen of public funds to wind
down the jusen companies, thus enabling the agricultural cooperatives to write off only 530 billion yen. In July
1996, the government set up the Housing Loan Administration Corporation to take over about 6.8 trillion yen
of the loan outstanding of the seven failed jusen. 
A number of failures of smaller (second regional) banks and cooperatives occurred through 1996. The first big
bank failure occurred in November 1997, with the bankruptcy of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the weakest
of the ten city banks. It is expected that it will require one trillion yen from the Deposit Insurance Corporation
to cover the bank's bad loans. The failure of Hokkaido Takushoku occurred in spite of the MOF pledge in the
early 1990s that none of Japan's major banks would collapse. In the aftermath of the Hokkaido Takushoku
failure, there were proposals to use postal savings money -- managed by zaito -- to buy subordinated bonds
issued by banks to supplement funds available to the Deposit Insurance Corporation. Shortly, thereafter, the
fourth largest Japanese securities company, Yamaichi, also collapsed, raising fears of a recall of foreign loans
(including loans to the U.S. Treasury) that, in the midst of financial failures in a number of other Asian
economies, could have triggered an international liquidity crisis. In December 1997 The Liberal Democratic
Party put together a plan to use at least 10 trillion yen of public money to support the nation's financial system.
This crisis of the Japanese financial sector has certainly contributed to the prolonged recession of the Japanese
economy in the 1990s. At the same time, however, Japan's industrial economy is very strong. While the
financial institutions wallow in bad loans, industrial enterprises are cash rich. In 1991 the ratio of their net
financial assets to GDP was minus ten percent; in 1996 plus six percent. Japan remains a creditor nation with a
very high savings rate. Japanese companies are investing in new technologies, and the Japanese economy is
generating persistent trade surpluses. At 3.2 percent, unemployment is Japan is high by the nation's postwar
standards but low by world standards. Despite the financial turmoil, Japan's formidable productive system is
not in danger of collapse.
Indeed the Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s is the result not of an underlying weakness in the productive
capacity of the Japanese economy, but of the transformation of the role of the nation's financial sector with the
maturation in the 1970s and 1980s of perhaps the most highly successful national economic development
effort in world history. The origin of the crisis lies in the participation of financial institutions in the
unregulated financial speculation to which the phenomenal success of the Japanese industrial economy in
international competition in the 1980s gave rise. During the 1980s, the returns on the wealth that Japan's
industrial development had created since the 1950s far surpassed the ongoing investment requirements of the
Japanese economy, so that even within a highly regulated financial system this surplus wealth was permitted to
find outlets in real estate and corporate stock speculation. Thus, in the wake of the very real and ongoing
success of Japan's industrial economy in international competition, the "bubble economy" emerged.
In the process, Japan's banks became less involved in financing the development of the industrial economy, and
instead turned to helping to expand the bubble until it burst. The very success of Japanese industrial
corporations made them by the 1980s much less reliant on the major banks to mobilize capital for their furtherdevelopment. In search of new business, Japanese banks engaged in lending activities that helped fuel the
speculative fervor. When, in 1990, the stock and land markets crashed, much of the value of the assets against
which Japanese banks had lent money vanished into thin air. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the role of the financial sector was to commit finance to industrial development
through the provision of low-cost and secure loans to industrial enterprises whose innovative potential was yet
to be revealed and whose prospects for financial returns were, hence, highly uncertain. The ability of banks to
gain access to BOJ preferential "overloan" credits and Trust Fund Bureau investments in bank debentures was
conditional on their willingness to play this developmental role. By the 1970s, the successful development of
the industrial companies that had been central to the emergence of Japan as a major economic power meant that
they had much less need for the banking system to play this developmental role. Beginning in the 1970s and
increasingly in the 1980s, as these industrial enterprises succeeded in developing and utilizing their productive
capabilities to generate sustained competitive advantage, they generated the returns that could be committed to
finance of their new productive investments, and they possessed the organizational capabilities that greatly
reduced the uncertainty inherent in these new investments. These companies now had larger and more secure
streams of retained earnings that they could use to finance their further growth, and for their additional funding
requirements they could go directly to securities markets. 
Moreover, with accumulated productive capacity in place, by the late 1970s companies did not have to invest as
much capital as in the high-growth era to get a given amount of sales revenues. They could also use retained
earnings and securities issues to reduce their bank debt, as indeed in the late 1970s and 1980s they did (see
Table 5). In 1980 for Japanese nonfinancial corporations, internal sources of finance (depreciation charges and
retained earnings) accounted for 58 percent of the total sources of funds, in 1985 54 percent, and in 1989 51
percent. Of the external sources of finance, in 1980 equity and debt offerings accounted for only 12 percent
and bank loans for 87 percent -- proportions that were in line with the sources of external finance during the
1960s and 1970s. In 1985, however, equity and debt offerings had risen to 17 percent of external finance and
bank loans had fallen to 81 percent, with "other sources" of funds accounting for the other two percent In 1989
the proportion of securities offerings was 27 percent, and bank loans only 64 percent, with commercial paper
(unused before the late 1980s) accounting for 5 percent and "other sources" the remaining 4 percent.
Table 5. Net Sources of Funds for Japanese Non-Financial Corporations 
Five-year averages, percent
Source 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 
Internal funds (depreciation and retained earnings 43.2 51.9 55.8 53.4 Equity issues 3.3 3.3 3.5 4.5 Bonds 1.7
2.5 1.4 5.9 Commercial paper 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 Loans (including foreign) 51.7 42.3 39.3 33.8 
Source: James E. Hodder and Adrian E. Tschoegl, "Corporate Finance in Japan," in Shinji Takagi, ed.,
Japanese Capital Markets: New Developments in Regulations and Institutions, Blackwell, 1993, 137.
From 1965 through 1977 the growth rate of bank borrowing by large manufacturing companies was
persistently positive, averaging about four percent per year, whereas from 1983 to 1989 this growth rate was
persistently negative at between minus one and minus two percent per year. In 1975 retaining earnings
accounted for ten percent of the capitalization of these companies, paid-in capital 20 percent, corporate bonds
five percent, and borrowings 65 percent. In 1990 retained earnings had risen to 28 percent, paid-in capital 24
percent, corporate bonds 26 percent, and borrowings 22 percent. Depending on the terms under which they
could raise funds on capital markets, even when these companies did not need to float securities to fund new
productive investment, it could be worth their while to do so to pay off bank debt or even simply to build up
cash reserves. Hence, the same developmental process that in the 1970s and 1980s eliminated the uncertainty
inherent in bank loans to industrial enterprises also enabled these industrial enterprises to reduce their reliance
on bank loans. 
Especially during the bubble economy of the late 1980s, as price-earnings ratios of corporate stock increased
dramatically, listed companies found that they could raise large sums by floating equities. In addition, theliberalization of the access of Japanese companies to international capital markets in the mid-1980s led to many
Japanese companies to engage in zaiteku -- or "financial engineering" -- which included significant issues of
convertible (including warrant) bonds as well as commercial paper on foreign markets. Companies listed on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange raised about two trillion yen annually through the sale of convertible bonds in the
1970s, and about four billion yen annually in the first half of the 1980s. From 1986 sales of convertible bonds
shot up, reaching 11 trillion yen in 1987 and peaking at 24 trillion yen in 1989. Warrant bonds were
particularly attractive to foreign lenders because they could sell the detachable warrants which could be
converted to stock. About 80 to 90 percent of these warrants were sold back to Japanese investors. The value of
the detachable warrant in the booming stock market meant that instead of a bond coupon of about five percent
that would be needed to float regular convertible bonds, Japanese industrial enterprises were able to float
warrant bonds with a coupon of one percent. In 1990, when the bubble had burst, one Tokyo-based analyst of
a Western money-market firm recognized that in securing these cheap funds on international securities
markets, Japanese industrial enterprises "borrowed for the future". 
It was an important part of the country's rise to industrial-empire status. The borrowing window was too good
to overlook, and corporate treasuries exploited Japan's rise to the hilt. What is most impressive is that all this
borrowing took place even though they did not need the money.
The result of the increased access of Japanese companies to internal sources of finance and capital markets in
the 1980s was, therefore, a dramatic decline in their reliance on bank borrowing. During the late 1970s and
even more so in the 1980s, the city banks, long-term credit banks, and the trust companies that made loans to
the larger Japanese industrial enterprises found themselves both losing their best customers and amassing huge
volumes of loanable funds -- in part because of large increases in deposits by these very same corporate
customers. As Shigeru Watanabe has put it: 
As large sums of funds flowed back to the banks from their blue chip borrowers, the banks were pressed by
the necessity of finding new borrowers and had to change their stance from one of waiting for customers to
come to them with hat in hand to one of reaching out to their prospective customers with specific project
proposals to cultivate and stimulate their loan demand. Table 6 shows how, from March 1985 to March 1990,
Japanese banks altered their loan portfolios. Loans to manufacturers declined, while loans to "real estate and
construction" shot up. So too did loans to "non-bank corporations", "other corporations", and "individuals",
with much of these funds either taking the forms of residential mortgages, loans backed by real estate as
collateral, or loans to non-bank corporations such as the jusen companies that used the funds to make
real-estate loans. 
Table 6. Net change in Japanese banks loans, March 1985 to March 1990
Change in trillion yen Percent change in share
City and Long-term City and Long-term 
regional banks credit, and trust banks
All banks regional banks credit, and trust banks All banks
All corporations 65.4 31.2 96.6 69.5 93.4 75.8
Manufacturers -1.5 -3.3 -4.7 -1.6 -9.9 -3.7
Real estate/ construction 22.3 7.7 30.0 23.7 23.1 23.5
Non-banks 15.4 21.0 36.4 16.4 62.9 28.6
Others 29.1 5.8 34.9 30.9 17.4 27.4
Individuals 27.3 1.3 28.5 29.0 3.9 22.4Others 1.4 0.9 2.3 1.5 2.7 1.8
Total 94.1 33.4 127.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Minoru Nakamura and Koji Yamada, "Financial Institutions in Japan," in Shigenobu Hayakawa, ed.,
Japanese Financial Markets, Gresham Books, 1996, 139. 
Land, of course, has always been a scarce, and hence valuable, asset in Japan, especially in the
Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka triangle where Japan's industrial development has been concentrated. Not only is usable
land scarce in Japan, particularly in the most developed areas, but what land there is does not easily change
hands. In Tokyo the annual turnover of land is about two percent, so when demand increases it presses against
a highly inelastic supply. During the first half of the 1980s the value of land for commercial, industrial and
residential uses in the six largest cities rose by about 40 percent. Then in the last half of the 1980s these land
prices rose by over 200 percent. 
Real estate loans in Japan went from an average of just over one trillion yen per year in the first half of the
1980s to about 7 trillion yen per year in the last half of the decade, peaking at almost 11 trillion yen in 1987.
The long-term credit banks, city banks, and trust companies -- for which loans to large companies had been an
important part of their business -- became heavily involved in loans related to real estate. The city banks
increased residential mortgages from about eight percent of their loan portfolios in 1984 (and seven percent in
1985) to 16 percent in 1990. Long-term credit banks increased loans to the real estate industry from less than
four percent of their portfolios in 1984 to over 13 percent in 1990, and trust companies from about 12 percent
to 16 percent. In addition, loans to non-bank financial institutions, which in turn lent heavily on real estate,
amounted to only two percent of the loan portfolios of long- term credit banks and eight percent of the
portfolios of trust companies in 1983 but 22 percent and 25 percent respectively in 1990.
Adding to the upward pressure on land prices were increases in government loans for housing purposes. As
we have seen, a key support for the Japanese system of finance is the Trust Fund Bureau of MOF which
controls investment of funds in postal savings accounts and public pension plans. At different periods in
Japan's postwar development, Trust Fund Bureau, through zaito, its Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, has
been able to make strategic investments, in the form of long-term loans, to sectors of the economy that were
deemed to be lacking sufficient capital. As can be seen in Table 7, loans for housing have always been an
important part of zaito's budget. During the high-growth era of the 1950s and 1960s, however, large
proportions of zaito loans were also devoted to support investments in transportation and communications
infrastructure and in industry, with large-scale industry and technology projects more predominant in the
1950s and loans to SMEs in the 1960s. What was different about the 1970s and (even more so) the 1980s was
the extent to which zaito loans went to housing. In addition during the 1970s and 1980s, zaito increased the
proportion of its loans to SMEs, loans that typically had land as collateral, borrowing up to 80 percent of its
market value. In seeking to provide much-needed support to expanding and upgrading Japan's housing stock
and to facilitating the growth of new firms, these Trust Fund Bureau loans added to the inflationary pressure
on land prices.
Table 7. Fiscal Loan and Investment Program (Zaito), Budget Allocation, 1955-1990
percent
1955 1965 1975 1985 1990
Housing 13.8 13.9 21.4 25.4 30.3
Environment 7.7 12.4 16.7 15.7 15.3
Social welfare 2.1 3.6 3.4 2.8 3.1
Education 4.5 3.1 2.9 3.6 2.0Small and medium enterprises 8.1 12.6 15.6 18.0 15.7
Agriculture, forests, fishing 8.9 7.2 4.1 4.3 3.1
Natural disasters 7.7 3.1 1.2 2.3 1.2
Roads and highways 3.7 7.9 8.0 8.8 9.8
Transportation, communication 12.2 13.9 12.7 8.4 8.3
Regional development 8.5 7.0 3.3 2.4 2.5
Industries and technology 15.8 7.8 3.0 2.9 2.9
International trade 7.0 7.5 7.7 5.4 5.8
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Takatoshi Ito, The Japanese Economy, MIT Press, 1992, 164.
Accompanying the rise in land prices was a rise in stock prices, apparently with stock prices leading land
prices. As price-earning ratios of listed stocks soared, it was tempting to look to the increase in the value of
land as a justification. Fortunes that were made on the stock market could be turned to the purchase of land.
On the supply side, the willingness of banks to lend during the 1980s was very much based on the notion that
land and stock prices would remain high. Indeed, during the height of the bubble of the late 1980s, there was a
tendency for banks to increase the proportion of loans backed by land that was valued at increasingly inflated
prices. Furthermore, banks sold and bought back some of their cross-shareholdings to increase their
capitalization, and thereby augmented the volume of loans that they could make under the equity capital
requirements for banks engaged in domestic and international lending. The dramatic decline in stock prices and
land prices since 1990 have wiped out a considerable proportion of the collateral on the loans that the banks
and other financial institutions made in the 1980s. 
The intergenerational dependence crisis
The banking crisis of the 1990s is an example of what happens when financial markets rather than business
organizations drive the allocation of resources in the economy. For the financial system to aid the process of
economic development, it needs to commit financial resources to enterprises that, through investments in
organization and technology, can develop and utilize productive resources. In the post-World War II decades,
this function was performed more by banks that mobilized Japanese household savings; from the late 1970s
this function has been performed more by successful industrial enterprises that, protected by
cross-shareholding, can mobilize their own internal revenues. 
Besides the role of the financial system in the process of "value creation", it also has a role to play in the
process of "value extraction". The process of economic development entails the allocation of not only financial
resources to the development and utilization of productive capabilities but also financial returns to participants
in the process. Key participants are employees, who receive their returns in the form of a stream of earnings.
As part of a dynamic process of economic development, value extraction and value creation can reinforce each
other. On the supply side, the expectation of a stream of earnings from participation in a successful enterprise
can give employees the incentive to engage in those activities that create the earnings that they can extract. On
the demand side, the success of large numbers of enterprises in a national economy in creating value provides
the earnings to large numbers of employees that can absorb the products that these enterprises produce and
hence generate the financial returns that the enterprise can reallocate. These returns can be further enhanced by
generating products that, even with high earnings for national employees, can gain market shares in
international competition.But, even under a system of "lifetime employment", employees do not remain productive forever, particularly
when, as in the case of Japan, the very sucess of their process of economic development has been a significant
factor in permitting people to live longer. To support people in retirement, there is a need to balance on a
sustainable basis the allocation of financial resources to support productive employment with the allocation of
returns to support retirement. Such a balance is easier to achieve in the presence of investments in productive
capabilities that make employees more productive over longer spans of their lives. 
With the most rapidly aging population that the world has ever known, Japan faces a severe challenge in
balancing the allocation of resources to productive employment with the allocation of returns to support
retirement. The proportion of the Japanese population aged 65 or older increased from five percent in 1950 to
15 percent in 1995, a period during which the proportion U.S. population aged 65 and over rose from eight
percent to just over 12 percent. In 1995 Japan's elderly population was still a smaller proportion of the total
than in most Western European nations. But, with the elderly rate expected to rise to 20 percent by 2010 and
25 percent by 2020, Japan is expected to have the most aged society in the world within the next generation.
Driving this rapid aging of Japanese society is a combination of longer life expectancies and declining birth
rates. In 1955, on the eve of the Japanese high-growth era, the average life expectancy at birth was 64 years for
a Japanese man and 69 years for a Japanese woman. By 1987, these figures were 76 years for men and 81
years for women -- the highest average life expectancies in the world -- a distinction that Japan still maintains.
Meanwhile, the birthrate has declined persistently, reaching a record low of 1.43 in 1995 (the 1995 birth rate
for the United States was 2.05 and for Germany 1.28). The rate was so low that in 1995 fewer babies were
born in Japan than in any year since records began to be kept in 1899. 
These demographic trends have generated a crisis of intergenerational dependence. In 1990 17 percent of the
Japanese population were in the 20-29 age group, while only 12 percent were in the 60-69 age group. The
proportion of the younger group rose to 19 percent in the mid-1990s but will decline steadily into the early
decades of the next century. Around 2005 the proportions will be about equal at between 15 and 16 percent,
but then the proportion of the older group will become increasingly greater than the proportion of the younger
group. In 30 years, it is expected that the proportion of those receiving government pension payments will
increase to over 40 percent from the current 20 percent. 
Despite Japanese savings rate that remain at 14 percent of GDP, these demographic shifts have already resulted
in ballooning government deficits to support the social welfare needs of the elderly population. All Japanese
are covered by national health insurance, with premiums based on income, and government subsidies for
retired, elderly, and low-income people. The public pension scheme is a two-tiered system. Available to all
Japanese residents, with 70 million participants in 1995, is a national pension plan, which provides the same
benefits to and requires the same premiums from each insured person. The government also operates an
employee pension plan, in which 33 million people participated in 1995, with premiums and payments
depending on the income of the insured. In addition in 1995 12 million people were covered by corporate
pension funds (42 trillion yen in assets), which can substitute for the state-run employee pension scheme, and
which are generally managed by life insurers and trust banks. Another 11 million people contributed to
tax-qualified pension funds (18 trillion yen in assets in 1995) that are managed in-house by companies, and
which cannot substitute for the government's employee pension plan. One can begin to receive pension benefits
at age 60, but in an effort to keep people working for more years and to reduce the cost to the government, the
age at which one can receive full benefits is being extended to age 65. 
According to the latest government estimates, by 2010 public pension benefits will be 15.5 percent of national
income, up from 7.5 percent in 1986, and over the same period public medical insurance benefits will rise to
between 9 and 15 percent of national income, up from 7.5 percent. Largely as a result of increased social
welfare expenditures, for 1997 combined central and local government debt as a proportion of GDP was
projected to be 96 percent in Japan, compared with 62 percent in the United States, 60 percent in both France
and Germany, and 59 percent in the United Kingdom. Beginning on April 1, 1997, the Japanese government
increased the consumption sales tax from three percent (which began to be levied in 1989) to five percent to try
to stem the growth of its indebtedness. Meanwhile, moreover, the banking crisis will not go away; in early
December the Japanese government was proposing a ten trillion yen bond issue to support the financial
system. It is possible that the government debt would be even greater but for zaito spending on goods andservices that would otherwise have to come out of the government's general account budget. 
The persistence of economic recession in the 1990s has not helped matters. Nor has the fact that as a long run
trend, higher levels of female labor force participation means that women are no longer as able or willing to
care for the sick and elderly as they were in the past. Between 1980 and 1990, as the number of people aged 65
and over increased by 3.8 million, the proportion of the elderly living with children or relatives declined from
72 percent to 63 percent. Proposals are now being floated for government funding of long-term nursing care
for the elderly.
The highly regulated structure of interest rates and the low yields on Japanese corporate equities are making it
difficult to generate the returns required to support the nation's aging population. At the same time, however,
the high volume of savings per Japanese household helps to offset these low returns. Low interest rates also
reduce the burden of the government deficits that are incurred to help support the aging population.
Nevertheless, with interest rates and dividend yields low, expectations of returns on savings are not being met.
Besides government deficits incurred to meet the obligations of the public pension system, corporate pension
plans are under heavy pressure as well. A study done for seventy-one major companies, including Nippon
Steel, Hitachi, and Toyota, calculated a 35 percent underfunding of pension assets in 20 years with a return on
investment of 3.5 percent (the current average) and with 4200 enrollees paying pensions to 1000 retirees at
current rates. The growing pension crisis is creating pressure to deregulate interest rates and unravel
cross-shareholding for the sake of higher returns. 
Proposals are also being floated to cut pension benefits and/or raise premiums. An alternative is to keep people
working for more years of their lives and to make working people more productive. The Japanese pension
problem would be further exacerbated if, as is the case in the United States and Germany, corporations and
their employees opted for early retirement plans. Given a surplus of workers in their fifties in many Japanese
companies, the recessionary conditions of the 1990s have made it particularly tempting for top management to
offer early retirement packages to lifetime employees in their early fifties rather than keep them employed until
the mandatory retirement age (currently 60 in most companies). Some companies have implemented such
programs. For example, by offering a number of popular early-retirement packages, between 1993 and 1996,
IBM Japan reduced its workforce from 25,500 employees in 1993 to 20,500 to 1996. But, with the departure
of many middle managers and a resurgence of its business activity, by early 1997 IBM Japan faced a shortage
of experienced personnel who could actually manage a business and could not be replaced by young college
graduates. In February 1997, therefore, the company terminated the buyout plan for employees under age 55.
Companies that are too aggressive about encouraging early retirement risk losing hard-to-replace human
resources. Much more common among major Japanese companies, as we shall see, is a strategy of reallocating
lifetime employees to subsidiaries so that they can remain employed and productive for more years of their
lives.
Responses to the Financial Crisis
The retain and reallocate strategy
If the Japanese were to follow the American model for dealing with the problem of intergenerational
dependence, they would disband the system of cross-shareholding and deregulate domestic interest rates to
generate a cash flow out of corporations that would support higher returns to savings. Much to the benefit of
the long-run development of the Japanese economy, however, the American model is not one that is being
pursued in Japan. Nor does it appear that is it one that will be pursued in the near future. 
Unlike the American institutional environment that favors market control over the allocation of corporate
resources and returns, the Japanese institutional environment favors organizational control. The American
model entails a corporate governance strategy of downsizing corporate labor forces and distributing corporate
revenues, whereas Japanese are pursuing a corporate governance strategy of retaining corporate revenues and
reallocating corporate labor forces. The institutional foundations for this retain and reallocate strategy are
cross-shareholding and lifetime employment -- institutions that, as we have seen, are still very much intact in
Japan.Yet the financial pressures brought on by the banking crisis and the retirement crisis persist in Japan. How,
given their institutional environment, are the Japanese responding to these pressures? What are the implications
of these responses for understanding the politics of corporate governance in Japan? 
The long-term financial problem facing the Japanese is the increase in intergenerational dependence. The
question is whether in the late 1990s their solutions to this problem are consistent with solutions to the shorter
run problem of restructuring the banking system. The government strategy for resolving the problem of
intergenerational dependence entails keeping people employed for longer periods of their lives, while
maintaining savings high and returns on domestic savings instruments low. The purpose of the government
strategy is to keep people productive for more years of their lives so that, as much as possible, they can sustain
their standards of living through productive employment. This national strategy is consistent with, and relies
fundamentally on, the corporate strategy of retain and reallocate, which in turn depends on the influence of the
institutions of lifetime employment and cross-shareholding on corporate governance. 
The retain and reallocate strategy requires the mobilization in existing enterprises and new enterprises of
committed finance for the development and utilization of productive resources. Retained earnings (protected by
cross-shareholding) along with low-cost debt (through regulated lending) remain, as in the past, the prime
means of mobilizing this committed finance, with the added advantage that, when warranted, major Japanese
companies now have easy access to securities markets to raise additional long-term funds.
The retain and reallocate strategy starts from the fact that the Japanese already remain in the labor force much
longer than in any other advanced nation. In the early 1990s, the labor force participation rate of men aged
60-64 was 75 percent in Japan, compared with 55 percent in the United States and 35 percent in Germany.
This despite the fact that employed workers in Japan are eligible for pensions at the age of 60.
Although high by international standards, the current labor force participation rate of Japanese men aged 60-64
is actually a sharp decrease from the rate of 84 percent that prevailed in the 1960s. It appears that, as in other
countries, Japanese workers have responded to increases in pension benefits by retiring earlier. The rate
declined to 71 percent in the late 1980s, primarily because of an increase in real pension benefits -- in 1973 the
government began indexing public pension benefits to inflation -- but also because of a decline of the
self-employed proportion of the population, who have a higher labor force participation rate of older workers.
In part because of the recession of the 1990s and in part because of a government policy to reduce pension
benefits, from 1988 to 1993 the labor force participation rate of 60-64 year old men reversed direction,
increasing from 71 percent to 75 percent in 1993. 
Working to increase this labor force participation rate over the next decade will be a government policy, already
in place, to raise the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 65. As early as 1984, in view of the rapid aging of the
population, the Ministry of Welfare had proposed reducing future pension benefits and raising the minimum
age of eligibility from 60 to 65. Benefits were reduced but, in the absence of policies that would ensure that
those between the ages of 60 and 65 would be able to find employment, political opposition prevented raising
the age of eligibility. The Ministry of Labor, therefore, proposed to the tripartite Employment Policy Council
that employers should be required to keep employees on their payrolls until the age of 65 -- a policy that
employers vigorously opposed. 
In 1994, the Japanese government revised the public pension system by moderating benefit levels and by
gradually extending the age at which people would be eligible to draw the full pension annuity from 60 to 65,
effective in 2013. The reform also introduced a new partial pension for those between the ages of 60 and 64
that provides about half of the full pension for those who would like to retire before 65. For those eligible for
pensions who still remain employed, the reform increased the amount of permitted earnings to ensure that total
income (earnings plus pension benefit) would not decrease as earnings rise. Public pension policy is therefore
working to keep people employed longer.
Meanwhile, through the government's administrative guidance supplemented by pressure from the unions,
companies have been encouraged to keep people employed longer. As we have seen, by the early 1990s
virtually all large companies and even the vast majority of small companies had increased the retirement age to
60, which in effect meant that, under the system of lifetime employment, companies undertook to keep theirworkers employed to this age. Starting in fiscal 1998, under the Law Concerning the Stabilization of
Employment of Older Persons, employers are being requested to extend the retirement age to 65 by the year
2013. 
In the late 1990s, the age-structure of corporate employment combined with the continuing recession puts a
strain on most companies that would seek to keep people employed even longer than is presently the case. The
post-war baby boomers are now creating a big bulge of middle- aged employees in Japanese companies. But
the demographics are changing, with the size of the population in their twenties peaking at 19.2 million in 1996,
with a predicted drop to 12.5 million in 2015. Meanwhile, the number of people in their sixties will increase by
about four million. Between 2000 and 2010, the proportion of the labor force aged 15-29 is expected to decline
from 23 percent to 18 percent, while the proportion over the age of 55 years is expected to increase from 23
percent to 27 percent. Other things equal, employers will find it necessary to employ an aging labor force over
the next two decades.
But, in an employment system that is influenced by corporate strategy, technological change, and international
competition, other things are never equal. To remain competitive, Japanese companies that employ an aging
labor force have to concern themselves with the productive contributions of older workers, relative to both their
pay and the productive contributions that could be made by younger workers. In the Japanese case, the high
level of education and the good health of the labor force in general combines with the prevalence of in-house
organizational learning to enhance the productivity of older, more experienced workers. The system of lifetime
employment creates incentives for companies to invest, and reinvest, in the capabilities of these workers and
make full use of their experience.
Nevertheless, the intense effort and commitment that organizational learning demands of workers, particularly
in the presence of rapid technological change, place limits on the incentive and ability of older workers with
given education and experience to attain higher levels of productivity. To enable companies to fulfill the
commitment of keeping workers employed even longer than is currently the case, the employment system must
be flexible enough to permit the reallocation of labor resources and returns to labor in response to changes in
the productive and competitive environments.
Within the framework of lifetime employment, Japanese companies already had such a flexible employment
system in place coming into the 1990s. During the 1990s that flexibility has been increasing in a number of
dimensions. The first source of flexibility of the employment system is the ability to maintain employment of
existing workers by reducing the number of new hires. The Japanese employment system is noted for the
practice, especially among the major companies, of recruiting new employees directly from the educational
system (high school in the case of blue-collar workers, university in the case of white collar workers). In the
past, when a company was growing rapidly and had not yet accumulated a large supply of experienced workers
whom it had to support, it could hire large numbers of new university graduates and then, after a decade or so,
decide which of the cohort were best suited for employment tracks that provided more responsibility, authority,
and pay. 
What is new in the 1990s is that employers have to be more selective about new hires. Hence there is a
heightened competition for university graduates with specific capabilities. All Japanese companies used to
adhere to the principle of hiring new employees at the same time every year to begin work on April 1. This
hiring institution (which to be sure some companies violated in practice) was meant to reduce competition
among companies for employees and ensure that the new employees would enter the company and continue
their careers in it as a cohort. Now it is becoming acceptable for companies to hire out of season. According to
a 1996 survey by Keidanren of 501 Japanese companies, 13 percent said that they already hire at various times
during the year and another 32 percent that they had such hiring practices under consideration. 
In addition, Japanese companies have traditionally filled all openings for lifetime employment positions with
men who were newly graduated from high school or university. These employees would then be trained
internally to develop specialized skills. Now, however, many Japanese companies are hiring people who have
already developed specialized skills, either through work experience or university training. The Keidanren
survey of 501 companies found that 27 percent were already recruiting people for specific jobs, another 12
percent for specific research jobs only, and 22 percent had such recruiting practices under consideration. Forexample, in the summer of 1996, Fuji Xerox started recruiting new graduates who already had significant
training in accounting, corporate planning, legal affairs and intellectual-property management to fill specialized
jobs in these areas. According to the manager of the company's employment-development center, "many
students [with such training] didn't consider coming to our company because they had to be salesmen for the
first few years." The more specialized recruits can now avoid such unwanted work. At the same time, an
increasing proportion of young workers who go to work for corporations are engaging in job- hopping,
although the ultimate objective of such labor mobility is still to find the particular company that can offer an
attractive lifetime career. 
The second source of flexibility is in rewards. Traditionally, lifetime employees have been recruited to
companies from high schools or colleges, and then over the course of their careers saw their earnings increase
primarily on the basis of seniority pay (with supplements for larger numbers of dependents). The main forms
of competition among employees were over the pace and type of promotion, although even then seniority
bulked large as a criterion for eligibility for promotion over the first two decades of company service. During
the 1990s individual performance has begun to count much more in determining promotion and pay. A 1995
survey of 210 companies based in Tokyo found that 24 percent had introduced merit pay systems and another
28 percent planned to do so in the next three years. In 1993 and 1994, Fujitsu, one of the leading computer
companies, became a pioneer in instituting merit-pay systems for its managers and team leaders. In 1996
Toyota Motor Corporation stopped promoting its managers based on seniority and increased to over 65
percent the proportion of management pay linked to performance. No longer will employees need a university
degree and 20 years at Toyota to be eligible for promotion from the lowest managerial rank of section chief to
the next rank of deputy manager. In other cases, companies have transformed managerial employees from
"line" to "staff" personnel. For example, NEC, another leading computer company, stripped 1300 of its 6000
managers of their supervisory functions and now employs them as in-house specialists working without
subordinates.
The third, and perhaps most important, source of flexibility is the reallocation of labor resources to positions in
subsidiary companies that offer lower pay and/or responsibility. As employees reach their late forties and early
fifties, major companies, in consultation with their enterprise unions, maintain the right to reallocate employees
to subsidiary enterprises where pay is generally substantially lower. Provided they can absorb these employees,
the benefit for the subsidiary is that it gets experienced personnel without having to invest in their skill
development. In some companies, the core company assigns employees to the subsidiaries, whereas in other
companies the subsidiaries recruit employees from the core company. At the same time, a small proportion of
managerial employees who are considered to be especially valuable to the company, are given the opportunity
to continue to work for the company in positions of executive responsibility and at relatively high pay even
after the official retirement age. 
One type of labor reallocation is shukko -- the "temporary" placement of a core company employee with a
subsidiary, with the core company often supplementing the pay of the transferred worker. In theory, under
shukko, the worker could be transferred back to the core company but in practice the transfer often becomes
permanent with the subsidiary taking over responsibility for the employee. A second type of labor reallocation
is tenseki -- the permanent transfer of an employee to another company. Most shukko and tenseki transfers are
from larger to smaller companies. Of all companies with 1000 or more employees, about 87 percent engage in
shukko and tenseki, and these transfers apply particularly to employees in their fifties. Many if not most
employees who are loaned to another company find that their new employment eventually becomes permanent;
that is, while employed at the new company, they find their status transformed from shukko to tenseki. 
Traditionally, both shukko and tenseki transfers were from a core company to a related company within the
enterprise group, but increasingly in the 1990s, as subsidiaries have found it difficult to absorb the number of
experienced personnel that the core companies want to reallocate, the core companies have been finding
unrelated enterprises to which they can make tenseki transfers. In other words, the commitment to lifetime
employment on the part of the core company is maintained, but the web of companies at which an employee
might end his career has become wider. Along with the wider web for maintaining lifetime employment, the
late-career pay of the transferred workers is more likely to be lower and his working conditions less attractive. 
It is from this perspective of the reallocation of labor resources that the Japanese phenomenon of enterprise"spin-off" has become of increased importance in the 1990s. Hiroyuki Odagiri characterizes what he calls
"hive-off" as "an organizational device intended to foster flexibility and reduce costs in labour management,
and to offer posts to middle-aged workers, mostly of a white collar nature." As he describes the process of
separating the new-born company from its parent:
There are several steps in hive-off. In the first step, the change may be merely legal and superficial, that is, from
a section within a big company to a legally separate company with the entire share held by the parent company
and nearly all the staff maintained as before. As the subsidiary expands, it starts hiring its own employees and
often seeks to enlarge its financial basis by inviting other parties (often companies or the public) to invest in its
shares. In some cases, this process continues up to the point at which the staff transferred from the parent
company are in a minority or non-existent, the parent's share of ownership becomes less than half, and the
management is chosen by internal promotion from among its own people. There are even cases where the
subsidiary becomes totally independent of the parent firm due to the latter's restructuring policy, and other
cases of the subsidiary expanding rapidly to dominate the former parent. Major companies take people and
money and spin off new businesses rather than keeping this labor and finance under the control of a legally
distinct business enterprise. Spin-offs can be suppliers or distributors in a vertical keiretsu or manufacturers of
a new line of products as part of a horizontal keiretsu or kigyo shudan. Spin-off cuts down on layers of
management and decentralizes authority and responsibility far more effectively than the much vaunted
multidivisional enterprise, in which responsibility may be decentralized while authority remains centralized. In
horizontal keiretsu, by creating new units of strategic decision making that are focused on particular products,
spin-off facilitates the integration of enterprise strategy and organizational learning. Spin-off increases the
number of managerial positions that entail authority and responsibility, without increasing the layers of
management, and hence is of great importance to the functioning of shukko.
Spin-off, therefore, reflects a system of corporate governance that permits a company to allocate both money
and people to the creation of a new business enterprise, which then itself has considerable autonomy in the
allocation of resources and returns. During the 1970s and 1980s, spin-off was used increasingly as an
organizational strategy. During the 1990s, it has become a particularly effective means for a company to
reallocate labor resources in ways that create new opportunities for its employees and potential sources of new
employment in the economy more generally. 
Although not all spin-offs entail the development of new technology, spin-off often functions as the Japanese
form of venture capital. In May 1997, Takahide Sakurai, co-chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy of
Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), explicitly proposed such new ventures as one way
of meeting the challenges to the Japanese employment system in the 1990s:
[Japanese executives] will probably also learn that organizing specialists in groups can produce good results, in
which case they will be revamping their organizational structure by spinning off more ventures. . . . It is now
especially important that companies look beyond their existing fields of business to the possibilities for
in-house ventures in new fields. We at Keidanren are asking each of our corporate members to launch at least
one such venture. And the number of firms responding to this call is on the increase.
In making this proposal, Keidanren, the most powerful organization of business interests in Japan, is
promoting, on a national basis, a business strategy that has long been practiced by the major industrial
enterprises. The leader in this campaign is Toyota Motor Corporation, whose president, Shoichiro Toyoda, is
chairman of Keidanren. In the summer of 1996, Toyota Motor Corporation set up a 50 billion yen venture
capital fund to provide financial assistance to ventures within its group. In June 1997 it expanded the program
to include ventures outside the Toyota group, generally taking equity stakes of 50 percent or more in each
company. In so doing Toyota Motor Corporation became the biggest single source of venture capital in Japan;
the next largest fund has 20 billion yen. As of June 1997 the Toyota fund had financed eight ventures, and,
with applications from about 300 companies, Toyota planned to invest in about ten companies per year in
industries such as semiconductors, information and communications, biotechnology, environmental
technologies, and services for senior citizens. 
Such efforts by Japanese corporations to allocate resources to new sources of domestic employment have
become all the more important as during the 1990s Japanese companies have increasingly shifted many of theiroperations to lower cost locations in Asia. In 1989 about 43 percent of foreign direct investment by Japanese
enterprises was to Asia; by 1994 about 83 percent, with more than 60 percent going to China. Most of this
foreign direct investment is in manufacturing, and much of it has been undertaken not only by large companies
seeking to rationalize their global operations, but also by SMEs (often in joint ventures with local companies)
struggling to cope with high costs in Japan that have been exacerbated by the strength of the yen. There has
been considerable outsourcing of materials and components that have then been reimported into Japan, and
hence have directly replaced jobs in Japan in a period that has seen a major decline of manufacturing
employment. In general SMEs have been moving the production of mass-produced components abroad while
maintaining precision and non-standard manufacturing in Japan. In 1995 imports of color televisions
surpassed domestic production for the first time, while foreign production accounted for 60 percent of all
microwave ovens and almost half of all VCRs manufactured by Japanese companies. More generally, between
1988 and 1994, the import penetration ratio for capital goods rose from 3.6 percent to 7.8 percent, for
consumer durables from 4.7 percent to 10.2 percent, and for non-consumer durables from 4.9 percent to 10.6
percent.
The acceleration in the pace of foreign direct investment and the rise in import penetration in the 1990s has
raised fears of a "hollowing out" of employment in Japan. Although in 1995, Japanese companies produced
only seven percent of their goods abroad, compared with 26 percent for U.S. companies and 15 percent for
German companies, the threat is that the Japanese mastery of the management of mass production may be
making it easier for Japanese companies to respond to high costs at home by relocating overseas. Besides
directly replacing the jobs of Japanese workers, the importance of SMEs in outsourcing to Asia has
compounded the problems facing large Japanese companies in their efforts to reallocate senior employees to
subsidiaries in Japan. 
Yet within Japan the consensus seems to be that the fears of "hollowing out" are overdrawn. Much depends on
the incentive and ability of Japanese companies to make new innovative investments in higher value-added
products and processes that require complex organizational learning. A 1994 survey by the Export-Import
Bank of Japan found that well over 90 percent of Japanese companies that had transferred production facilities
overseas either had retained their key technologies or were developing more advanced technologies in Japan.
Many opportunities exist for developing these technologies in small technologically oriented companies that
are networked horizontally and vertically with other innovative enterprises in their industries. 
In contrast to the decline in demand for bank loans by those Japanese industrial enterprises that, through the
success of their innovative enterprises, grew large in the postwar decades, SMEs still rely heavily on bank
finance. Thus the growth of SMEs provides opportunities for bank finance on the model that proved so
successful in the past. In addition, the growth of SMEs is also being supported by the large number of
powerful industrial enterprises that now exist in the Japanese economy. Indeed, as we have seen, the support of
SMEs has become all the more important for these large companies, not only to develop the capabilities of their
suppliers and distributors, but more generally to enable them to reallocate older workers to subsidiaries while
investing in the capabilities of younger workers in the core company, and thereby maintain their commitment to
lifetime employment.
There is abundant evidence that, in the late 1990s, Japan is well-positioned in terms of its accumulation of
technological capabilities and investments in new technologies to regenerate its industrial base. In
manufacturing the Japanese retain distinct competitive advantages in the integration of precision engineering,
advanced materials, and electronics. Prime sectors for industrial innovation are in the provision of
telecommunications services, transportation services, and energy -- inputs to Japanese industry and key
components of the Japanese cost of living that remain high cost in comparison with other advanced economies.
Another key sector, as we shall discuss, is financial asset management, where the challenge is to transform
specialized banks into diversified financial service providers without undermining the Japanese system that
provides financial commitment to economic development.
The success of Japanese manufacturers in factory automation combined with the movement abroad of
manufacturing processes that employed Japanese blue-collar workers means that, to take advantage of the new
technological opportunities, a larger proportion of the Japanese labor force will need higher levels of education
and specialized training. After remaining stable since the late 1970s, the ratio of males in the college-age cohortattaining a college education began to increase in the mid-1990s. The changing hiring patterns of Japanese
companies along with the increasing use of incentive pay reflects the needs of these companies to attract and
retain more highly specialized personnel than was the case in the past. Under these changing technological and
employment conditions, the institutions of lifetime employment and cross- shareholding are becoming all the
more important as social foundations for the integration of the capabilities of highly educated and specialized
producers into cumulative and collective learning processes.
The politics of corporate governance
What groups in the Japanese economy have an interest in the corporate strategy of retain and reallocate? The
Japanese labor movement, for one, has a strong interest in this strategy. Such an interest on the part of labor
cannot, however, be taken for granted. In the United States, the downsize and distribute strategy during the
1980s and 1990s has proceeded largely with the acquiescence of organized labor. In excluding labor from any
influence over the allocation of corporate resources, the institutions of corporate governance in the United
States have left organized labor with virtually no power to oppose corporate downsizing. As for the allocation
of corporate returns, the wages of unionized workers in large industrial companies in the United States are high
relative to others in the economy with the same level of education. But even for these workers, as well as for
retired or downsized blue-collar workers who had long employment tenures with these companies, much of the
corporate returns that are accruing to them are coming from their corporate pensions, which have increasingly
in the 1990s been invested in corporate stocks. Hence, senior unionized workers who have been victims of the
"downsizing" strategy have nonetheless benefited from the "distribution" strategy, thus helping to account for
the quiescence of the U.S. labor movement -- which first and foremost represents these senior workers -- to the
corporate strategy as a whole.
In Japan, in contrast, the organized labor movement has an influence over the allocation of corporate resources
as well as the allocation of corporate returns, and is using that influence to reinforce government initiatives to
keep the labor force productively employed. Within the framework of lifetime employment, enterprise unions
are striving to unite interests of older and younger workers by supporting corporate strategies that keep older
workers employed and productive for more of their lifetimes and that reinvest in organizational learning that
create new opportunities for younger workers. 
The task is made easier, however, for the Japanese unions as well as Japanese employers by the general
exclusion of women from the commitment to lifetime employment and by the demographics of the Japanese
labor force, that reflect not only changes in birth rates and death rates but also the general exclusion of
immigrants from access to good jobs in Japan. Rather than have labor migrate to capital, corporate capital is
migrating to labor. Through foreign direct investment, residents of foreign nations are now gaining relatively
good jobs in Japanese companies. It is important to recognize that the intergenerational unity of interests of
labor within Japan is one that exists alongside the exclusion of groups who have been, over the last few
decades, vying for inclusion in the United States. At the same time, it is also important to recognize that in the
United States, under the regime of downsize and distribute, it has largely been women and minorities who have
been excluded from stable and remunerative jobs. Social exclusion exists under both systems, but it works in
different ways.
In Japan, the retain and reallocate strategy means that the returns to employees come more from productive
employment than from high yields on financial assets. During the 1990s, the savings rate in Japan has
remained high at about 13 percent (compared with four or five percent in the United States), and the average
amount of savings per household in Japan in 1996 were 13 million yen. As a proportion of national income,
insurance policies in force in Japan were in 1994 almost two and a half times those in the United States. In
generating incomes for households, the high volumes of savings per households are offset by the low yields on
savings instruments available within Japan's regulated financial structure.
Bank and postal savings deposits absorb fifty-five percent of these savings, with life insurers holding 20
percent, private pensions five percent, and money trusts four percent. Another 12 percent of savings are in
securities. Japanese life insurers, which manage a large portion of private pension funds, have a legal obligation
to pay benefits out of interest income, and have invested primarily in Japanese government bonds. During the
1980s, in search of higher yields, the life insurers invested heavily in U.S. treasury bills, but sustained hugelosses in the last half of the 1980s with the appreciation of the yen relative to the dollar of about 60 percent. In
the last half of the 1980s the insurance companies also shifted their assets from domestic loans and bonds to
equities, and then sustained huge losses in the early 1990s when the stock market crashed. 
In the 1990s, with the cost of their obligations around five percent but with dividend yields on stock well under
one percent, the insurers have stayed away from new stock purchases. They have shifted much of their assets
into subordinated bank debt and loans to consumer credit companies, but have not been able to come close to
the five percent rate of return they require. In early 1996, the life insurers reduced their guaranteed returns to
pension funds from 4.5 percent to 2.5 percent, leading some major pension funds to turn from life insurance
companies to trust banks and investment advisory companies to manage their portfolios. In the spring of 1997,
Nissan Mutual Life Insurance Company, the sixteenth largest life insurer, went bankrupt, resulting in more
withdrawals of funds from the insurance companies. 
Given low and regulated interest rates and the low yields on corporate stock, any higher rates to Japanese
pensions will have to come from investments on international capital markets. Such investments, even in safe
foreign securities, are fraught with exchange rate risks, as the Japanese life insurers found out in the late 1980s.
A prime motivation of the "Financial Big Bang", announced by Prime Minister Hashimoto after his re-election
in November 1996 is to better position the Japanese financial sector to manage such risks as they pursue
higher yields on the savings under their control.
Japan now suffers not so much from a crisis of the Japanese financial system as a crisis in the ways in which
the financial enterprises that have been central to that system -- particularly the long-term credit banks, trust
banks, securities companies, life insurance companies, and some of the weaker city and regional banks --
allocate the financial resources under their control and generate financial returns. In the 1990s these financial
enterprises have found themselves on the short end of speculative investments, made within a highly segmented
financial system, that cannot generate returns. The "Financial Big Bang" entails a deregulation of the
segmentation of financial services in Japan to create new business opportunities, both at home and abroad, for
those banks, securities companies, and insurers that are best able and willing to rise to the challenge. Such a
strategy requires financial enterprises that have a sound financial base at home and that can develop the
capabilities to operate simultaneously and quickly on international securities markets and money markets.
These augmented capabilities could open up new sources of profits for these financial enterprises, thus
enabling them to employ more people in Japan and to bring in higher returns on household savings. 
But, despite the image of radical change that the reform's slogan is meant to impart, Japan's "Financial Big
Bank" does not entail a deregulation of domestic interest rates nor a dismantling of cross-shareholding (see
Table 8). From the government's perspective, the success of this strategy of financial reorganization will
depend on the ability of Japanese financial enterprises to learn how to make profits in the international world of
financial liquidity, while being denied the opportunity to extract higher financial returns from productive
enterprises at home. Such a transformation, if successful could enable now fragile financial enterprises to
survive while tapping into high returns on financial assets abroad that would augment the returns on savings at
home. Thus the returns on domestic savings could be increased without undermining financial commitment to
productive enterprises in Japan. In transforming their capabilities to provide financial services, Japanese
financial enterprises already face formidable competition within Japan from foreign companies. the largest of
whom have been operating in Japan since at least the mid-1980s.
Table 8. Deregulation Timetable for Japan's "Financial Big Bang"
FISCAL 1997
Securities houses will be allowed to handle consumer payments for their clients. 
FISCAL 1998
Companies and individuals can handle foreign exchange transactions without government authorization. Banks
will be allowed to sell their own investment trust over the counter. Ban on financial holding companies will be
lifted. Firms can become securities brokerages without government licenses. Securities houses will be allowedto expand asset management services. 
FISCAL 1999
Securities houses will be free to set their commissions on securities trading of any size. Market-value method
will be applied to marketable securities. Barriers that restricted banks, trust banks and securities houses from
entering each other's markets will be removed. Banks will be allowed to issue straight bonds. 
BY THE END OF 2001
Banks and securities houses will be allowed to enter insurance sector. 
SCHEDULE NOT SET
Enactment of a new financial services law that would govern banking, securities, and insurance sectors. 
Source: Masato Ishizawa, "'Big Bang' program taking clearer shape," Nikkei Weekly, June 16, 1997.
Neither the deregulation of domestic interest rates nor the unraveling of cross-shareholding is part of the
"Financial Big Bang" agenda. Indeed, despite its failure to control the bubble economy of the late 1980s and to
contain the accumulation of bad loans in the 1990s, the power of MOF and BOJ to coordinate and regulate the
Japanese financial system in favor of productive investment has increased during the 1990s. The need to
ensure financial conditions that can help transform non-performing loans into performing loans has provided a
rationale for maintaining the structure of low and regulated interest rates. As for financial leverage, MOF's
Trust Fund Bureau directly controls at least half of financial transactions in Japan. With the return on postal
savings accounts still somewhat more favorable than the return on commercial bank accounts, and with the
banking system in fragile condition, an increasing proportion of Japanese household savings have been
deposited with the post office. 
Some, however, see the current financial reforms in the organization of the banking sector as a prelude to a
dismantling of cross-shareholding that will eventually give financial interests their higher returns. In May 1997,
for example, Akiro Kanno, Vice Chairman and Senior Executive Director, Zenginko (Federation of Bankers
Associations of Japan) remarked to an audience of American, European and Japanese business executives and
government officials:
Japan is trying to carry out financial deregulation in a very Japanese way: protecting vested interests and
preserving the old divisions of work. A new system is necessary, one that can account for and tax new financial
products. Investor protection needs to be implemented and monitoring and supervision must be brought to a
level of global acceptability if Japan is to take its place alongside London and New York as a world financial
market. A slowdown of the reform efforts would be the worst possible thing. Because of the current savings
peak -- attributed to the ageing population -- the Tokyo market must be reformed now; this is quite possibly
the last chance. Reform efforts are underway in the banking industry, one that for so long has been like a
fortress to foreigners because of the cross- shareholding of shares (accounting for up to 70% of total shares at
its peak). Banks are now beginning to sell off their cross-held shares to make better use of their funds,
Relationships are changing in the industry. Observers should expect more M&A activity involving foreign
companies. The financial change will be the key reform. 
Others contend that, with the deregulation of the financial services sector, Japanese households will gain access
to alternatives forms of savings that will lead to withdrawals from the postal savings system. For example,
Jesper Koll, head of research at JP Morgan Securities Asia, has argued: "By the year 2010, the postal savings
system will be privatized, either by law or simply circumstance." How far the "Financial Big Bank" can
proceed without creating powerful financial interests that have not only the incentive but also the ability to
extract higher yields from the Japanese economy itself remains to be seen. What can be said is that the current
agenda for financial reform is being driven by a retain and reallocate perspective on the relation between
corporate performance and financial returns. Such a strategy is inconsistent with the ideology of financial
deregulation and shareholder "value-creation" that has driven the downsize and distribute strategy in the UnitedStates. It is dangerous, therefore, to analyze the possible outcomes of the transformation of the Japanese
financial sector from an American perspective on the allocation of resources and returns.
In terms of its policies on retirement and interest-rate regulation, the Japanese government has thus far
manifested its commitment to the retain and reallocate strategy. But some cracks in the unity of the government
position have already appeared, not just from the rise of new political parties that espouse more far-reaching
financial reform, but also within the ruling LDP itself. Over the past year, Junichiro Koizumi, the Minister of
Health and Welfare -- that is, the ministry responsible for dealing with the financial requirements of an aging
society -- has been in the forefront of a movement to privatize the postal savings system, and has, reportedly,
threatened to resign if Prime Minister Hashimoto does not support him on this issue. In February 1997,
Koizumi advocated privatization of the postal businesses at a Diet Budget Committee meeting. Then at a Diet
plenary session he stated: "If the New Frontier Party (Shinshinto) [the largest opposition party] submits bills
for privatization of postal businesses, I will vote for them." 
The postal savings system, of course, provides the bulk of financial resources of zaito, which is in turn the
source of MOF financial, and political, leverage over the economy. As a "shadow budget, zaito has often, quite
rightly, been accused of permitting government spending plans to proceed outside the government's general
account. As Koizumi argued: "Japan is being drawn into global competition. I doubt whether one can truly
carry out meaningful reform if we leave intact a national bank that operates outside the market economy."
Koizumi added in an interview: "I don't think I am odd. The politics here are what is odd." 
Finally, will corporate executives, in their decisions concerning the allocation of corporate resources and
returns, continue to pursue the retain and reallocate strategy. Japanese corporate executives have not heretofore
had the same opportunities as their American counterparts to use the stock market to cash in on their positions
of corporate power. In May 1997, however, the Diet voted to change the Commercial Code so that corporations
can issue stock options to their employees. The legislation is seen as an effort to help revitalize the flagging
stock market. When stock options were banned under the Commercial Code, some companies had issued
warrant bonds and then bought back the warrants to give to top executives. With stock options now legal, a
survey of 200 major listed companies found that 70 percent were eager to begin a stock-option system, and by
the beginning of June Toyota, Orix, Nichimen, and Tokyo Electron had announced plans. In Toyota's case, it is
planning to give stock options to all of its 56 board members. According to the Nikkei Weekly report, however,
a Toyota director "sought to allay worries that company leaders would take drastic action, like announcing
layoffs, to raise stock prices. The introduction of stock options, he said, will not hurt the good parts of
Japanese-style management." 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry has also seen stock options as a way of encouraging new
ventures. As we have seen, in line with the retain and reallocate strategy, an important Keidanren initiative is to
encourage the top executives of major corporations to allocate both money and people to the spin-off of
business enterprises and the support of new ventures. Adherence to the retain and reallocate strategy is also
evident in a recent statement by Takahide Sakurai, president of Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Co., Japan's
second largest life insurer, and co-chairman of Keidanren's Committee on Economic Policy:
The task of a progressing collapse in Japan's system of long-term employment appears to be premature. . .
While it is certainly no easy matter to find a set of employment arrangements that can enhance the satisfaction
of workers even as it pleases employers by lifting productivity, Japan's companies need to do just that. Should
they abandon their efforts to construct such a system, surplus workers will find themselves being swept into
the labor market, and the unemployment rate will move higher yet. This is because Japan's labor market for
people in midcareer remains underdeveloped, since companies prefer recruits fresh out of school. Over the
longer term, the graying of the Japanese population will swell the ranks of middle-aged and older workers.
Companies must therefore continue to seek better employment systems without allowing short-term business
trends to distract them.
Other Keidanren representatives appear less committed to a strategy of retain and reallocate that has a more
flexible version of lifetime employment as its foundation. In May 1997, Masaya Miyoshi, president and
director general of Keidanren was reported to have remarked at a high profile conference in Tokyo:Nikkeiren [Japan Federation of Employers Associations], Keidanren's sister organisation, produced a report a
few years ago that is still valid. It sees a Japanese employment market where executives and executive
candidates will keep lifetime employment, but a second group of specialists will become increasingly mobile,
constantly moving around in order to find the best opportunities. A third group, which is already forming, will
be temporary staff. Government action such as portable pensions and pay scale will promote labour mobility.
There is also less and less bias towards moving to a foreign company.
Miyoshi's reference is to a 1995 Nikkeiren report, Japanese Management in a New Era -- Direction and
Concrete Policies, in which, among other things, a survey of its 2000 member companies, revealed that 20
percent had already introduced a performance-oriented wage system. The Nikkeiren report proposed that in the
future corporate employees be classified into 1) career-track workers (managers, managerial candidates, and
core production workers) to whom the institution of lifetime employment would continue to apply, 2)
well-trained and well-educated specialists employed on a short-term contracts and paid according to results,
with no retirement pay, and 3) general workers, employed as hourly part-time workers doing simple tasks with
no retirement pay. Nikkeiren would like to see the size of the first group diminish and the second group
expand. But to date the employment of well-educated and well-trained people without lifetime employment is
negligible, largely because corporate investments in the development of the requisite capabilities of these people
still relies on a system of lifetime employment.
Besides Keidanren and Nikkeiren, the other important organization that brings together Japanese corporate
executives on issues of national social and economic policy is Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate
Executives). Its 1600 members include the top executives of 900 large Japanese corporations who, according to
the organization' brochure,
[share] the common belief that corporate managers should be key players in a broad range of political,
economic, and social issues. Within Keizai Doyukai, each member sheds their corporate identity and
participates as an individual, free to express opinions and ideas distinct from any specific company or industry.
At Keizai Doyukai's fiftieth anniversary general assembly in April 1996, its chairman, Jiro Ushio (also CEO of
Ushio Inc.), suggested that the organization review cross-shareholding and intragroup keiretsu arrangements
with a view toward moving toward global standards and creating an entrepreneurial spirit. He has emphasized
the "reform of the financial system and the dismantling of the convoy fleet system" and "active corporate
management of firms with an emphasis on ROE." At the Economist's Fourth Roundtable with the Government
of Japan, Yuzaburo Mogi, Vice Chairman of Keizai Doyukai (and president of Kikkoman Corporation), took
up the free-market theme more explicitly. As he put it:
The attitudes of Keizai Doyukai include much overlap with those of Keidanren. A Keizai Doyukai document
entitled "Declaration in support of market principles" encompasses the ideals of free and liberal markets and a
globalism that results in an enhanced Japan as a venue for business activities. The current situation of a debt
that is 90% of GDP and a rapidly ageing society is a crisis for Japan. Japan is second in the world in terms of
GDP but only captures 0.4% of the world's inward FDI. There is a huge imbalance in outward versus inward
direct investment. In most places, this ratio is 2:1; in Japan it is 15:1. Reasons for this include high prices, the
high cost of personnel, excessive government and private regulations that make it difficult to do business, and
customs and practices that are difficult for foreigners to understand and adopt. However, Japan has a high
growth potential despite the bubble. There is a good unemployment level, high quality labour and a huge
savings base. How can the situation be fixed? First the Japanese market must work more like a market. The
system that worked during the post-war expansion and the bubble economy is no longer proper for the period
of stable growth in a new information-oriented environment. Today the government market represents 10% of
GDP and another 40% is comprised of heavily regulated markets -- accounting for half of the economy. In
order to meet future challenges, the financial institutions must change; corporate management must change;
more responsibility should go to shareholders instead of employees and clients; international accounting
standards must be adopted with more disclosure and better investor relations; and new business ventures must
be created. Japan has a start-up rate of 4.6% versus 15.8% in the USA. A favourable environment must be
created for this to change.
In this version of the changing objectives of the corporation, the notion of creating shareholder value, sopopular in the 1980s and 1990s with American corporate executives, is creating shareholder "esteem". In
responding to a question on the difference between a Japanese kaisha and a Western-style company, Mogi
reportedly said that 
there are parts of the Japanese system -- lifetime employment, seniority systems and company relationships --
that are good and must be protected. One example is the superb training that it allows. But, the government
recognises that this system no longer works in a Japan that has "caught-up" already. The market must now be
the mechanism to allocate resources and shareholder esteem becomes essential, [thus] enabling the
development of a new Japanese system that takes the best from the Japanese employment system making it
work towards a desirable ROE." 
The commitment to lifetime employment and cross-shareholding among Japan's top corporate executives is,
therefore, by no means complete or wholehearted. Within the Japanese system, it is these top managers upon
whom the blame is heaped when their companies cannot sustain the employment of their regular labor forces.
What has been going on in Japan in the 1990s, however, is not an unraveling of lifetime employment but a
movement toward greater flexibility in the allocation of the labor resources of lifetime employees and the
returns that they receive. More flexible hiring, remuneration, and reallocation of personnel across companies
are all important elements of the current attempts to keep the Japanese labor forces employed productively for
longer periods of their lives. 
Be it in Japan or elsewhere, it is organizations, not markets, that, by developing and utilizing productive
resources, generate the sustained competitive advantage of enterprises and the sustainable prosperity of nations.
The challenge facing Japanese companies is to ensure that the move to a more flexible allocation of labor
resources and returns results in the higher quality, lower cost products that can sustain the prosperity of the
Japanese economy. Corporate responsibility for the development and utilization of human resources will
remain essential to meeting the challenge. Rhetoric about the benefits of "free markets" for the allocation of
resources and returns is no substitute for the careful analysis of how institutions, organizations, and markets
interact to generate economic development.
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